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Abstract
The focus of this dissertation is narrative identity theory, i.e. the proposition that our 
sense of self is structured like a story. The imputed advantage of narrativity identity is 
that it enables great coherence and guidance to our complex lives composed of 
multiple and often conflicting inner impulses and social demands. The manner in 
which this is accomplished is that narrativity functions metaphorically as a tacit, 
formative operation, which transfers the intelligibility inherent in the familiar domain of 
stories to the more elusive domain of personal identity. Narrativity is an epistemically 
efficient kind of discourse which can synthesize a multitude of elements into a unity 
called plot. A plot gives unity to the whole of a story and confers significance to its 
parts. Both narrativity and metaphoricity are the more recognizable products of an 
underlying mechanism both share, i.e. productive imagination. This faculty 
pervasively and continually configures the whole field of our experience, accentuating
the relevant structures of our physical, social or inner, affective-mental environment 
(context) and projects the path through this environment towards a physical destiny, 
social accomplishment or resolution (direction). With the tools of classic Husserlian 
phenomenology and its radicalization in Heideggerian existential hermeneutics the 
main concepts of narrativity, metaphoricity and productive imagination can be further 
clarified and connected. This will enable a discussion about the question whether the 
ontological status of narrative identity can be construed such that either 1) personal 
identity merely has narrative cognition available as a pervasive, tacit tool to cope with 
life, or 2) whether our personal identity is nothing but the product of the productive 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
"Each of us constructs and lives a 'narrative' . . . this narrative is us, our 
identities”     -- Oliver Sacks
§ 1. Introduction
This dissertation is the fruit of my research on the concept of narrative identity, i.e. the
claim that our sense of self is structured like a story. While investigating this concept it
became clear that narrativity functioned metaphorically, not in the sense of a literary 
figure of speech, but as a tacit, formative operation, which transfers the intelligibility 
inherent in the familiar domain of stories to the more elusive domain of personal 
identity, especially in regards to the intimate and often problematic significance of its 
life-span. 
I will provisionally define identity as our sense of (inter-)personal self, maintaining a 
sense of continuity throughout its changeable experiences and behaviors over a 
temporal span, providing relative stability, situational awareness and goal-directed 
orientation in one's life. 
Metaphors can be defined as an epistemically efficient kind of proposition which 
renders a more abstract aspect of life intelligible in terms of a more familiar one. Life 
can be understood metaphorically as if it were a struggle, journey or story, with the 
latter one incorporation the the first two when put in narrative form. It may provide 
clarity by identifying hidden similarities between two different domains. Metaphors 
operate on the basis of transference of meanings from one domain to another and are
more innovative and pervasive than initially acknowledged. 
Stories can be defined as an epistemically efficient kind of discourse which can 
synthesize a multitude of elements into a unity called plot, i.e. the story's 'point', moral
or message. Stories not only contain characters and their interactions within fictional 
or historical settings, leading to unintended complications and surprising turns, but 
also--explicitly expressed or not--the characters' desires, motivations, perspectives, 
thoughts, deceptions, moral perceptions, moods and emotions. And, directed to the 
story's audience, narratives might convey practical information, advise, warnings, 
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threats, existential insights; promote mythic or secular cosmologies, ethical standards,
religious and political preferences, etc. These heterogeneous ingredients are all held 
together by the synthesizing operation of emplotment, which gives unity to the whole 
of a story and confers significance to its parts in their contribution to the overarching 
plot. Narrativity is also more innovative and pervasive than initially acknowledged. 
One big step deeper, both narrativity and metaphoricity are the more recognizable 
products of an underlying mechanism both share, i.e. productive imagination. This 
faculty is harder to define. It pervasively and continually configures the whole field of 
our experience, accentuating the relevant structures of our physical, social or inner, 
affective-mental environment (i.e. context) and projects the path through this 
environment towards a physical destiny, social accomplishment or resolution (i.e. 
direction). This faculty usually goes about its way with an automaticity at lightening 
speed not necessarily detectable by our waking consciousness. This faculty is also 
operative in our more cognitive-linguistic endeavors like understanding simple 
propositions, grasping the sense of a metaphor, or getting the gist of a story. This 
faculty is so pervasive, as will be later argued (§ x), that nothing meaningful can be 
accomplished without its aid. 
Allied and overlapping with the productive imagination are the concepts of 
schematism, intentionality and categorial intuition. Schematism covers the tacit 
dimension of the rules and procedures (using schemata and images) operative as a 
mediator connecting the sensible realm of intuitions with the intelligible realm of 
concepts as Kant and later cognitive psychologists worked out. Or, more simply 
expressed, it is the mechanism by which experiences and words get connected into 
intelligible wholes. Schemata also enable the co-dependent interaction between 
sensible and bodily motor experiences (kinesthetics; Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 203-6). 
We better see when we move and better move when we see. 
Mostly these schematic projections pan out and are submerged in the fluency and 
apparent obviousness of our daily routines, whether in verbal discourse like a 
conversation or a physical action like finding one's way in a large building. When 
actions do not pan out we can get a glimpse of this faculty. When a hammer breaks 
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there occurs a pause in which we can reflect on how it actually came to be that we 
non-theoretically understand the equipmental context and sequential , step-wise goal-
directedness of our hammering action. Such routines can also get deliberately slowed
down and investigated through careful, phenomenological reflection in first person 
mode, either during a real execution or in reproductive imagination. At the same time 
all our behavior can of course be observed from a third-person perspective and 
analyzed into constituent elements through scientific inquiry.
The concepts of intentionality and categorial intuition will be elucidated later (§§12-
13). These technical concepts originated in the school of phenomenology and are of 
such basic importance for the whole of thre argument made in this dissertation that 
demand, and will receive, careful clarification.
Given all of the above, schematic-metaphoric-narrative identity, or just narrative 
identity, can be circumscribed as follows: Stories provide the open-ended templates, 
which are metaphorically used for our self-understanding in the form of self-narration. 
And narrativity, in a) its epistemic efficiency of synthesizing abundant amounts of life's
contextual and directional aspects and b) in its metaphorical applicability to our 
selfhood, thereby enables great coherence and guidance to our complex lives 
composed of multiple and often conflicting inner impulses and social demands. 
Because metaphors and stories are the more innovative expressions of productive 
imagination and constitute in their combination our sense of personal identity, it 
became imperative to investigate this faculty to better understand the concept and 
experience of narrative identity in its evolutionary origin, its current level of 
functionality, and its possibly malleable, contingent nature, including the possibility of 
its transformation or outright suspension.  
§ 2. Novice Concept of Narrative Identity
The concept of narrative identity can be illustrated provisionally with succinct quotes 
from representative narrative identitists1, i.e. those who ascribe to the idea that our 
1 The noun 'identitist' sometimes covers those who ascribe to the idea that mental states and 
neurological states are identical. Others have the term preceded by a qualifier like 'Christian 
identitist' to mean that the core of one's identity is defined by Christianity. I use it as a shorthand for 
those who think that our identity's core is of the format of a narrative. 
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personal identity is structured, lived, shared and explainable in narrative terms. One 
early and influential narrative identitist—and possibly the founding father of the 
concept--is the American Thomist philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre. He conceived 
narrative identity as “a self whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links 
birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end” (1981: 205). “ . . . we all 
live out narratives in our lives and . . . we understand our lives in the terms of 
narratives . . . Stories are lived before they are told—except in the case of fiction” 
(1981: 212). An oft quoted statement comes from the American psychologist Jerome 
Bruner, who contends that the “self is a perpetually rewritten story . . . in the end, we 
become the autobiographical narratives by which we 'tell about' our lives” (2003; 
italics in original). Dan McAdams is another American psychologist who came out 
strongly as a narrative identitist and defined narrative identity as “a person’s 
internalized and evolving life story, integrating the reconstructed past and imagined 
future to provide life with some degree of unity and purpose” (2013: 233). McAdams 
was a pioneer who since the mid-1980s argued that “identity takes the form of a story,
complete with setting, scenes, characters, plot, and themes” (2003: 187). 
Within continental philosophy it was the French hermeneutic-phenomenological 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur who firmly established the concept of narrative identity as 
the answer to a series of questions circling around the central question of “Who am 
I?” To answer this question is “to tell the story of a life. The story told tells about the 
action of the 'who'. And the identity of this 'who' therefore itself must be a narrative 
identity” (1988: 246). And because the organizing principle of a story and its 
characters is its plot, Ricoeur tried to show that our identities “are themselves plots” 
(1991: 143). Narrativity also became important to the American phenomenologist 
David Carr, who considered it “the unifying form common to two sets of possible 
oppositions: it is on the one hand the unity of the lived and the told, and on the other 
hand the unity of the individual and the social or historical” (Carr, 1991:184). 
Interestingly, Carr found a quote in a work by the founding father of phenomenology 
and major philosophical framework of this dissertation, Edmund Husserl, stating that 
“the ego constitutes himself for himself in, so to speak, the unity of a 'history'” 
(Husserl, 1969b: 75; quoted in Carr, 1991: 74). Following MacIntyre, Ricoeur and 
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Bruner, the American philosopher Charles Taylor also subscribed to the concept 
stating that a “basic condition of making sense of ourselves [is] that we grasp our lives
in a narrative” and that “making sense of my present action . . . requires a narrative 
understanding of my life, a sense of what I have become which can only be given in a
story” (1989: 47 & 48; italics in original). Though Taylor functions as a bridge between 
psychological and philosophical notions of narrative identity, the bridge is a bit narrow.
Taylor only dedicated two pages to this "basic condition" and refers his reader for 
more insights to its pioneers. More helpful is the professor of counseling Donald 
Polkinghorne, who is on excellent terms with both American psychology and 
continental philosophy. His study Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences (1988) 
explores and sings the praise of the peculiar intelligibility integral to narrativity.2 In a 
section titled “Self as Narrative” he states that “we achieve our personal identities and
self concept through the use of the narrative configuration, and make our existence 
into a whole by understanding it as an expression of a single unfolding and 
developing story” (1988:150). He does not see our personal identity residing in a soul 
or body substance but in a constitutive process in which “the self is a concept defined 
as the expressive process of human existence, whose form is narrativity” (1988: 151).
The last quote to share is from Wolfgang Kraus, a German narrative identitist, who 
wrote in his dissertation that "the self is a social self, which essentially thinks and 
presents itself in a narrative manner" (Kraus, 2000: 183; translated from German). 
Following Aristotle's thought in his Poetics, this study will be structured as a narrative, 
which in a skeletal fashion has a beginning, a middle, and an end, and includes two 
main components, i.e. a series of complications and their subsequent denouement, a 
term borrowed from French in which it means un-knotting or dis-entanglement. Their 
parallels in this paper would be a series of what I would call 'complexifications', with 
which I mean that some complex understandings of narrativity, identity and allied 
concepts like metaphoricity and the imagination and all their interactions will come 
into play to the extent that their entanglements can become quite bewildering and 
2 Polkinghorne initially found that narrative knowing, in the mode that clients try to understand and 
heal themselves through the stories they tell, is an effective therapeutic tool in psychotherapy. Then 
it dawned upon him that self-knowledge through narrativity could be transposed as a research 
method to academic psychology and subsequently found it fruitful as a research strategy in the 
human sciences in general (1988: ix - xi). 
5
unwieldy. I do have a denouement from this 'dramatic' entanglement, but, to be 
candid, I do not yet know how that will pan out. In that sense the writing of this paper 
will be like an adventure, which, because that would be not unlike a story, could be 
chalked up as justification number one for the narrative structure of this paper. 
But before engaging in the hard work there are several stories to be told. The first one
is the background and context of this paper and the second is the more personal 
context of discovery story of how I myself got involved in the first place .
§ 3. Background and Historical Context.
Since the mid-1980s the theory of narrative identity has become a research program 
in continental philosophy and in psychology. This focus is part of a larger "turn to 
narrative" in the social sciences foreshadowed in the 1960s in France as a reaction to
structuralism, resulting in a "seemingly unbounded wave of narrative theorizing" since
the mid-1980s (Bamberg, 2007b: 1). Though the concept of narrative identity was not 
entirely new, the outstanding pioneers were the French hermeneutic-
phenomenological philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1981, 1983-88, 1991); the American 
Thomist philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (1981, 1992) and the American psychologists
Dan McAdams (1985), Theodore Sarbin (1986b) and Jerome Bruner (1986). The 
concept was quickly picked up and deepened by, among others, Donald Polkinghorne
(1988, 1991, 1996), Charles Taylor (1989), David Carr (1991), Michael Bamberg 
(1997, 2004, 2011) and Marya Schechtman (2007, 2011, 2014). 
In his 3-volume Time and Narrative (1983-88) Ricoeur initially put the concept of 
narrativity in service of bridging dichotomies between scientific and subjective notions 
of time; between the unity of time and its dispersal in past, present and future (both 
named “aporetics of temporality” [1988:4]); and between descriptive science and 
prescriptive ethics. His project was a continuation of the philosophical investigation of 
time, building on the accomplishments of mainly Aristotle, Augustine, Husserl and 
Heidegger. He concluded that in the last analysis one has to admit to “the ultimate 
unrepresentabilty of time” (1988: 242) and that even the tools of phenomenology fell 
short. His central point was that “temporality cannot be spoken of in the direct 
discourse of phenomenology, but rather requires the mediation of the indirect 
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discourse of narration.” (1988: 241). Though initially talking about a “confrontation 
between an aporetics of temporality and a poetics of narrativity” (1988:4), in the end 
he considered this a productive tension, especially in the search of individuals and 
communities for their narrative identities (1988: 274).i
Ricoeur worked this idea out in Oneself as Another (1992) in which he proceeded to 
develop a theory of narrative identity with the tools of phenomenology, hermeneutics 
and narratology. His theory consists of at least the following basic propositions: 1) the 
self constitutes action and action constitutes the self; 2) narrativity holds both 
together; 3) narrativity mediates in the dialectic of our sense of changeable selfhood 
(ipse identity) and our sense of durable sameness (idem identity); and 4) narrative 
identity mediates the dialectic between Self and Other including a multitude of ethical 
implications (116ff,140ff, 317ff). 
In the field of psychology Dan McAdams and Jennifer Pals (2005) constructed an 
inclusive model of personal identity they named “The New Big Five”. In this model the 
narrative component comprises an individual's most unique aspect even while 
integrating four other elements: 1) our inherited nature, 2) dispositional traits 
(O.C.E.A.N., which is the 'old' Big Five), 3) characteristic adaptations and 4) our 
social-cultural context (§ 25). Marya Schechtman developed and refined "The 
Narrative Self-Constitution View" (2007, 2011), though, after processing Strawson's 
critique of narrative identity, she downplayed the narrative component of identity and 
replaced it with the 'Person Life View' in which our embodiment and biological nature 
gained prominence over narrative intelligibility (2014).
Philosophical criticism of the concept of narrative identity came from British analytic 
philosopher Galen Strawson (2004, 2015), who challenged the psychologists (parried 
by Schechtman, 2011 and Arca, 2018) and within phenomenology challenges came 
from the Hungarian László Tengelyi (2004) and the Czech Jakup Čapek (2016) 
building on Tengelyi.
What became pivotal in my reading sequence during this study was the exploration of
the underlying schematism of one's life story formation by psychologists Susan Bluck 
and Tillman Habermas in their papers “The Life Story Schema” (2000) and “Getting a 
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Life” (2000). Schematism here is interpreted as a set of four interconnected 
coherences enabling and limiting the construction of one's own life story and by 
extension one's narrative identity--a subtle but crucial difference I will address in §50. 
The Ontological Status of the Narrative Self. From this paper I bore my way 
chronologically back through the more cognitivist developments of the schematism 
concept (Neisser, 1976; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Rummelhart, 1980) all the way 
back to Kant's concept of the faculty of the imagination in which the idea of 
schematism might have originated (1978) and from there up again to Kant's 
appropriations by Heidegger (1962b, 1997), Ricoeur (1977) and Johnson (1987 & 
2005). 
The extraordinary thing is that the crucial concepts of metaphor, narrativity and 
schematism, which all came into play while doing research, have gone through career
paths of approximate 'universalization' and have become in certain research 
programs foundational instead of peripheral.3
The larger intellectual historical development is that the positivist research program 
looking for law-like deductive-nomological explanations had run into an impasse 
(Spector-Mersel, 2010) and that therefore more marginal concepts like metaphor, 
narrativity and schemata could come to the fore (Mulaik, 1995).
§ 4. Initial Aims 
The title of the research, “The Possibility Conditions of Narrative Identity”, indicates an
aim around a central concept. The central concept is narrative identity and the aim is 
to bore down as deep as possible into its possibility conditions in a phenomenological 
manner. 
The starting point will be an explication of the central concept by gathering and 
melding some of the major insights from philosophy and psychology resulting in a 
layered concept of identity composed of a ground level of commonly shared natural 
characteristics, a middle level of more contingent, individualizing components, and a 
top layer of the most contingent, fragile component constituted by narrativity. This will 
3 Summaries of the career paths of narrativity and schematism can be found in endnotes xvi and
xvii respectively.
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be executed in the section “Advanced Concept of Narrative Identity” (§20-32). 
This aim can be pictured in layers going top to bottom from a) personal identity 
formation; to b) the role of narrativity as an organizing principle of personal identity; to 
c) metaphoricity as the source of novel meaning formations enabling narrativity to be 
projected upon personal identity; and to d) schematism as the mechanism of any 
meaningful projection whatsoever enabling metaphor-based semantic innovations. 
This work will be presented in the chapter Complications (§33-46). 
§ 5. Plan of study: Extending Aristotle with Labov and justification from Frank
I will first give a succinct overview of Aristotle's thought on narrative structure, which 
then will be extended by the findings of American linguists William Labov and Joshua 
Waletzky about narratives' essential structural order and function. Then I will give an 
overview of American sociologist Arthur W. Franks' finding that the presence or 
absence of a narrative structure is often decisive why certain academic papers are 
considered publishable and others not. 
Following Aristotle's Poetics a story has a beginning, a middle, and an end (1450b – 
20-35), and includes two main components. First there is a series of complications 
comprised of actions which set the stage for a denouement, which encompasses all 
the changes of fortunes of the hero until the happy or tragic ending (1455b – 20-30). 
During the denouement a discovery will be made by the hero which will change his 
fortunes (1452a – 30). Besides setting, characters and incidents a story also has a 
thought, which would prove a particular point or a general truth. What keeps all these 
parts together is the “Unity of a Plot”, which not only provides “the combinations of the
incidents of the story” (1450a – 15-16), but is also the most essential part of a story 
(1450a – 39). 
The influential paper “Narrative Analysis: Oral Versions of Personal Experience” by 
Labov and Waletzky extended Aristotle's narratology with the help of empirical 
research. They looked for invariant structures in simple stories told by a wide range of
Americans of different age, ethnicity and location, which could be extrapolated to any 
narratives whatsoever. Their findings on what they think were the function, minimal 
components and structure of a narrative will be addressed later in this study under the
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heading Narrativity (§35). For this introduction I will only use what they saw as the 
sequential components of most stories, a sequence which I intend to adopt for the 
structure of this study. 
Labov and Waletzky analyzed and identified in total six kinds of clauses or simple 
phrases in stories. The Abstract, which is optional, indicates the beginning of a story 
and presents its subject matter. The Orientation describes the setting of the story with 
its characters, location and time frame. Complication is where the initial action takes 
place made up of narrative clauses in usually chronological order. The Evaluation 
(congruent with Aristotle's Thought) is the part of the narrative where, either explicitly 
in a comment or implicitly in a more non-verbal fashion through intonation or gesture, 
the narrator discloses his own evaluative perspective as the point of the story. It 
usually is the point where “ . . . the complication has reached a maximum . . . ” (30) 
and something happens or is decided which represents a turn in the story. The 
Evaluation is followed by the Resolution (congruent with Aristotle's Denouement), 
which tells what finally happened and gives closure to the story. The last component, 
another one which is optional, is the Coda, which brings the story back to the here 
and now of the narrator. The terminology of 'maximum complication', evaluation and 
resolution seem to overlap, which is well captured in Labov's visual schema where all 
three kinds of clauses come together and there is a 90° shift in direction: ii
Figure 1. "The normal form of narrative" (37).
The inspiration and justification for adopting the Labov and Waletzky sequence I 
found in a paper by the Canadian sociologist and socio-narratologist Arthur Frank, 
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titled “After Methods, the Story”(2004). Frank posed the question why certain 
academic papers were accepted for publication and others not. His conclusion was 
that, though most papers were methodologically sound and made some academic 
contribution, those which were published usually had a narrative structure and that 
the best narrative structure was the detective genre. His complaint about non-storied 
papers was that “ . . . nothing happens that seems to warrant a readers' 
attention.”(430; italics in original). He therefore advised prospective paper writers to 
open with something compelling; go into uncharted territory; and give a sense where 
the action is. Writing is writing 'towards' and not not 'about'. It should be open-ended 
and adventurous. In other words, writing 'about' implies a clear bird's eye view of the 
territory and trajectory. Writing 'towards' is grounded in a situated, bit opaque 
beginning, going through an uncharted middle phase with a provisional sense of an 
ending. 
§ 6. Note on Methodology
My disciplinary approach is within the Continental philosophical movement of 
phenomenology, though I am also open to more analytic, science-oriented 
approaches. Because of my studies with the hermeneutic phenomenologist and 
Heidegger expert Theodore Kisiel at Northern Illinois University I received a thorough 
introduction in Husserl and his '101' methods of bracketing and eidetic variation as 
well as in Heidegger and his grafting of existentialism and hermeneutics unto 
phenomenology.iii
Bracketing aims at suspending one's usual quotidian interpretations of the nature of 
experience, such that a gestalt-switch might take place going from 1) a natural 
attitude, including one's preferred metaphysical, religionist or scientific views, to 2) a 
consideration of our experiences from within such experiences and bring new 
observations to language with the help of a vocabulary more appropriate to 
experience itself, without the help of explanatory constructs which look from outside-
in. 
Eidetic variation, also named free imaginary variation, aims at teasing out the 
structures and dynamics of this 'new' field of investigation by methodically imagining 
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variations of the phenomenon under investigation to see which components are 
essential and which could be regarded contingent, what temporal aspects they might 
have, and how they relate to neighboring phenomena. 
By applying these two inter-connected investigative strategies Husserl could construe 
that consciousness is always already intentional, that is, it has a directional structure, 
a directing-itself-toward, aiming at something 'outside' itself and doing so with a mode 
of access correlated to its object. Husserl also pointed out that a sequential dynamics 
belongs to intentionality, which goes from a) empty intending, to b) possible fulfillment,
to c) relative identity; and that most of our intentional acts are complexly structured 
content-wise by a categorial (Husserl) or syntactical (Sokolowski) kind of 
organization.iv
§ 7. Caveat
As stories select and combine an economic amount of events and characters to fit its 
plot and make its point, this study will also have to select those which are most 
relevant, leaving unused multiple more detailed studies for reasons of space. One 
manner in dealing with the papers and insights for which there was no space is to at 





§ 8. Context of Discovery
The starting point of this project was Czech phenomenologist Jakup Čapek's very 
recent presentation “Experience and Storytelling: Narrative Identity and 
Phenomenology” (2016), which surveys theories of narrative identity by other 
phenomenological philosophers like David Carr (1991), Dan Zahavi (2005) and László
Tengelyi (2004). 
Jakub Čapek (Charles University, Prague) was a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at the 
Phenomenology Research Center, Carbondale, Illinois, to do research on identity. I 
chose his paper as a starting point because 1) it addresses the problem of identity 
formation; 2) and does so within a phenomenological framework; 3) the question 
regarding the connection between narrativity and identity (and action) seems to be an 
ongoing and current philosophical research program; 4) I might have studied with 
Čapek if I had chosen to pursue my masters in philosophy at Southern Illinois 
University, Carbondale. 
Čapek discerns three assumptions on which the narrative account is based: 1) 
personal identity is conceptualized in terms of selfhood; 2) selfhood is constituted by 
the idea of life-unity; and 3) this life-unity has a narrative structure (2). According to 
Čapek, Carr tried to phenomenologically substantiate the narrative account by 
arguing that both the structure of selfhood and experience itself are always already 
narrative in nature (6-8); Zahavi has his reservations because he distinguishes 
between a fundamental, minimal self and a founded, narratively constituted self, 
though both are in harmony (9-11); and Tengelyi is diametrically opposed to the 
theory of narrative identity because, not only can selfhood not be reduced to a 
narrative structure, but narrativity actually distorts selfhood as it is merely a reduced, 
simplified “retrospective fixation” of past experiences and therefore negates, even 
suppresses, the rich, unpredictable, ambiguous nature of prospective action, which he
names--following Merleau-Ponty--the “wild region of life-history”.(11-15) Čapek sides 
with Tengelyi and finds assumptions 2) and 3) refuted while embracing the first one. 
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Čapek's and Tengelyi's critical views on narrative identity will be later addressed in the
section of complications. 
The point I want to make here is that I initially had a intuitive sympathy for the 
narrativist view and caught myself defending it even though I had to admit that 
Merleau-Ponty's concept of a “wild region of life-history” exerted a certain appeal. 
After consulting some of the works mentioned I quite quickly formulated the following 
question which became my leading question: 
§ 9. Differentiating the pre-narrative, narrative, and trans-narrative
Can one make a case for the differentiation--within the context of the question 
regarding narrative identity--between a pre-narrative, narrative, and trans-narrative 
field of identity and action? Čapek (like Ricoeur and Tengelyi) makes the case that the
diachronic unity of narrative identity is still a founded (in the Husserlian sense) and 
sometimes even unstable intentional accomplishment and not an existentially 'given' 
structure (Carr), in which one is always already thrown and implicitly abiding 
(Heidegger). There are limit experiences which can threaten and confuse one's 
personal and collective narrative identity. During psychotherapy some people might 
regress to pre-adolescent states of identity formation, only to re-build their life story 
along more healthy lines (Erikson, 1968: 212-6) , and during conversion there might 
be a wholesale switch as one world narrative gets replaced by another (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966: 156). Such radical changes would indicate a more originary, pre-
narrative, pre-personal field of identity and action (Heidegger, 1962; Sartre, 1957; 
Merleau-Ponty, 1962). 
The other side of this coin is the possibility of a trans-personal, masterful overcoming 
of narrativity in what I would provisionally formulate as a trans-narrative, expert coping
behavior, exhibiting a spontaneous or immanent teleology (or immanent narrativity) 
independent of any directionality integral to an explicit story-plot or long-term project. 
The main template for such a trans-narrative state I derived from the brothers Dreyfus
and their phenomenology of skill acquisition in five stages. Their highest state of 
expert encompasses skillful coping on a practical level and moral maturity on an 
ethical level, with both dependent on a fine-grained, circumspective perception of 
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one's situation and not on verbal-cognitive constructs (Dreyfus, 2006; Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus, 1986, 1991).v
The specific connection between the tripartite differentiation proposed above and the 
investigations of the different thinkers mentioned can be found in the different ways 
they structure the dynamic between a) the realm of implicit, lived experience and b) 
the realm of explicit, reflected experience. What comes to mind is the following 
classification of these dynamic structures: 
1. An ongoing dia-lectical relationship between a) the lived and b) explicated 
realm (Husserl, 1970b: 123-35; Carr, 1991: 102-16).
2. A progressive developmental model going from a) naive, implicit, through b) 
analytic-reflective to c) authentic, masterful coping (Dreyfus, 2006; 
Heidegger,1962: §74; Krishnamurti, 1954: 50-6). 
3. A tri-lectical, circular relationship between a) implicit, practical understanding,
b) explicit, verbal interpretation and c) application in praxis, which will impact a)
again (Heidegger, 1962: H382-87/434-49; Gadamer, 1960: 274-3414; Ricoeur, 
1983: 52-87). 
The metaphor of a spiral (Carr, 1991:184) might come in handy to combine both 
developmental and circular (multi-dialectical) models.
Because Ricoeur enrolled narrativity as 1) a central, mediating concept in trying to 
solve (admittedly in gradations of success) some of the aporetics of time, while 2) 
also bridging with the concept of narrativity the realms of descriptive action and 
prescriptive ethics, as well as 3) providing the most elaborate and sophisticated 
hermeneutic-phenomenological justification of both personal and collective narrative 
identity theory, his concept of narrativity will attain a prominent position in this study. 
Especially important is his concept of a three-fold mimesis of a) our implicit 
understanding of action, b) its interpretation in narrative composition, and c) its 
subsequent adaptation in, and refiguration of, the world of the hearer or reader (§23).vi
4 Pagination to the 1979 Sheed & Ward edition. The relevant sections are "The Rediscovery of the 
Fundamental Hermeneutic Problem" (Second Part, II, 2) and "Analysis of Effective-Historical 
Consciousness" (Second Part, II, 3).
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ORIENTATION B: PHENOMENOLOGY 
§ 10. Introduction
Before getting into the meat of this study I like to insert an introductory section on 1) 
some of the basic concepts of phenomenology (§§10-15) and then 2) 
phenomenology's connection to empirical psychology, because so many of its 
empirical results will be 'lifted' into a more phenomenological framework (§§16-19). 
The first part aims at what I have experienced as one of the most crucial concepts in 
phenomenology and that is the capacity or skill of categorial intuition. It is both a very 
simple and straightforward kind of experience, because it underlies any and all of our 
experiences, but it is also, in its more sophisticated explication, a very productive 
concept capable of breaking open and analyzing some very complex philosophical 
matters. I will proceed by highlighting the following sequence of concepts: 
intentionality (§12); categorial intuition (§13); and eidetic reduction (§14)
The second part is about the division of labor between philosophy and psychology 
and within these disciplines the differentiation between investigating on one side 
functions and on the other side their genesis. An important chunk will be dedicated to 
Husserl's concept of internal time-consciousness (§18). 
§ 11. Categorial Intuition - A
Phenomenology does explicate, develop and apply a special skill. It is the skill of 
having philosophical insights or intuiting essences, but now in a way in which 'having 
an insight' has come, within western philosophy, to an unprecedented level of self-
evident self-understanding. Phenomenology's founding father Husserl called these 
philosophical acts 'essence-intuitions' (Wesenschau) and through such acts he also 
made some penetrating investigations into the necessary conditions to make such 
acts possible. This claim can become intelligible on the basis of understanding a) the 
intentional structure of consciousness, b) a peculiar perceptive capacity called 
categorial intuition, c) a philosophical procedure called eidetic reduction and d) the 
specific subject-matter phenomenology is interested in, i.e. the essential structures 
and dynamics of experience, including the for this study important experience of 
understanding and using metaphors, following and telling stories and, in their 
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combination, the lived, narrative meaning of this world and our own identity. 
§ 12. Intentionality5
Intentionality in phenomenology means that consciousness is always consciousness 
of something (Husserl, 1970a, V2: 94-125; Heidegger, 1992: 27-44; Sokolowski, 
1974: 18-56). In all psychological acts like seeing, remembering, counting, discussing,
etc., we are directed or focused on a certain seen, remembered, counted or 
discussed object and not on the act itself or the 'I' enacting the act. Consciousness is 
not a container within the brain, duplicating what is outside itself with the senses 
acting as intermediaries. Who would be then conscious, and in what way, of what is 
contained in the container? Another container? Properly speaking consciousness is 
always already outside itself, directly, through its senses, in the world of its cares, 
whether practical, social or theoretical. An important part of intentionality is the 
phenomenon that we can emptily intend an object and also experience different 
grades of fulfillment of the intention, through which then the self-sameness of the 
object can be experienced over a minimal temporal stretch. Examples of empty 
intentions are: looking for a lost object, trying to remember a forgotten phone number, 
the content of any statement before it is personally verified, not understanding a self-
evident statement like A=A, or not seeing yet that intentionality is a basic feature of 
consciousness. This dynamic of intentionality is important for a deeper 
phenomenological understanding of issues like knowledge and evidence, mistakes 
and misunderstandings, and the philosophical trio of necessity, possibility and 
actuality. It will get some deeper treatment in the analysis of minimal narrative 
structures (§34).
§ 13. Categorial Intuition
The really important issue here is what Husserl calls categorial intuition (kategoriale 
5 This section, with some edits, was lifted from an article I wrote for my then fellow Theosophists to 
make the case that Theosophy and phenomenology could productively influence each other and 
that phenomenology also could have a similar relationship with the transformative philosophy of 
Jiddu Krishnamurti (Schuller, 2004b). As an aside, I found that I had this temporary belief in the 
Theosophical worldview in common with the translator of Husserl's Logical Investigations, the 
south-African phenomenologist John Findlay (Cohen, 1985: 9-11). For him Theosophy was a 
launching pad into Neoplatonism, for me into a more physicalist and evolutionary worldview. 
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Anschauung. Husserl, 1970a: 269-320), a concept Heidegger found highly important 
(Heidegger, 1992: 47-71; Kisiel, 2002: 84-100). Categorial intuition organizes and 
structures, on a pre-theoretical, pre-thematic level, our simple perceptions into 
complex 'states of affair.' This happens for example when we go from seeing just a 
house to seeing that the house is white, or that it is bigger than its neighbor, or is in 
front of another one, or any other specific feature or relation it might have. On a more 
complex level we can use the example of seeing a row of trees or hearing a melody. 
The peculiarity is the following. The trees and notes are sensuously given, but the row
and the melody, though they are experienced, they are not sensuously given. The 
pattern and melody are items that are not part of the raw data entering our senses, 
and because of that easily overlooked peculiarity they might even not be experienced 
at all. You might just see some trees and not perceive the row pattern, and you might 
just hear a sequence of musical notes without experiencing the melody. At the same 
time, when these patterns are experienced, it is obvious that they are not merely 
subjective in the sense of an arbitrary processing of information, or some form 
imposed upon the data by consciousness. Once perceived, the pattern and melody 
are really out there and have their own kind of objectivity, which can be pointed out to 
others, and shared with them. To come back to the example of the house, one could 
ask where or how in the sensuous experience the 'is', 'bigger' or 'in front' resides 
when the perception is articulated in the statement 'the house is white' or 'the house is
bigger than its neighbor' or 'the house is in front of another'. We can see the house, 
the white color, its neighbors, but where and how do we see the feature and the 
relations? It is these kinds of structuring of our experiences that find their way, when 
expressed in language, in the non-sensuous parts of language, in words like 'being', 
'this', 'and', 'or', behind', 'unity', 'plurality,' etc. These items of experience are not 
merely subjective forms imposed upon sensuous experience, nor are they to be found
in sense perception. These items are given to consciousness with and founded upon 
sensuous experience, through a non-sensory kind of perception, i.e. categorial 
intuition. 
In short, categorial intuition is a non-sensory manner of creating Gestalts out of our 
experiences, upon which more complex linguistic acts can be built like metaphors and
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stories. As shall be later unpacked in more detail, all three of these acts (categorial 
intuition, metaphorical transference, narrative emplotment) are enabled by the 
productive imagination. 
§ 14. Eidetic Reduction
Eidetic reduction is a procedure by which one gradually comes to understand the 
essence or univocal meaning of an issue through free imaginative variation (Husserl, 
1973: 340-8; Gurwitsch, 1964: 189-97). If the issue is understanding the essence of 
the practical object 'coffee-cup,' one would take its various features and relational 
aspects and change them in imagination until it becomes obvious that one couldn't 
speak of a coffee-cup anymore. For example, imagine changing the opening at the 
top to being gradually more tilted and ending up on the side, at which point it can not 
contain any fluids anymore and therefore hardly qualifies as a cup. Or gradually 
change it weight, size, or material. What one ends up with are those features without 
which a coffee-cup wouldn't be a coffee-cup, that is, its structural essence. These 
features could then be gathered into an extended definition of the item, like 'a small 
non-porous, heat-resistant delivery device, weight- and size-wise proportionate to a 
human body, for intake of warm water-solved caffeine.' In the previous example the 
issue was the essence of a specific practical object, an issue phenomenology is 
hardly interested in. What it is interested in--among many issues--is the essential 
complex structures of the experience of using any practical object whatsoever, though
it could proceed or abstract from the example of a coffee-cup, or a hammer as 
Heidegger does, to uncover these essential ideal forms.
§ 15. The Concept of Categorial Intuition Categorially Intuited
Last step is to show that when we make statements about the essential structures of 
consciousness itself we are dependent on categorial intuition. For example, when 
Husserl makes the case that consciousness is always intentional, he could not do so 
by merely reflecting upon his own consciousness. He had to structure that peculiar 
investigative reflective experience and have it confirmed and refined through varying 
repetitions, i.e. eidetic reduction. He saw that when one wills, something is willed; 
when one thinks, something is thought; when one sees, something is seen, etc., etc. 
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He saw that every act of consciousness has its own peculiar correlative 'object' to 
which it is directed. Consciousness is always consciousness of. The importance here 
is not this structure of intentionality itself, but the idea that once you see this structure 
for yourself it is because of categorial intuition, which means that you are categorially 
intuiting a non-sensuous item with its own claim to objectivity. Moreover it is a 
philosophical act. It is not a scientific hypothesis to be tested in a psychological 
laboratory. It is categorial intuition in the first place that makes science possible by 
ongoingly and in ever more refined ways structuring its subject matter. Science even 
doesn't need to know about this possibility condition to proceed successfully. And it is 
not a religious experience either. Phenomenology can uncover things about 
ourselves, and these revealings can be experienced as a revelation of some sort, but 
phenomenology's subject matter does not reach farther than the necessary possibility
conditions, or ideal forms, of our experiences and can't say anything about its content 
qua content. It is by an act of faith that faith's specific content is constituted, which will
provide a content only for theology to investigate, while phenomenology can only 
investigate the essential structure of the act of faith and the correlative kind of being 
of its intended object, regardless of its content.6 Husserl called these philosophical 
acts 'essence-intuitions' (Wesenschau), which only bring out what comprises the 
structuring ingredients implicitly within any experience whatsoever and make them 
therefore more intelligible
Heidegger refines this notion of phenomenological explication of the structures of 
experience with his idea of 'formal indication' (Formalanzeichnung), of which Dasein 
(Being-there) and Being-in-the-world are his most well known (Heidegger, 2004: 42-
45; Kisiel, 1993: 169-70). These peculiar Heideggerian concepts, here emptily 
intended (formally indicated), will find their own appropriate fulfillment in acts of 
understanding, which can only be called acts of existential self-knowledge, because 
the concepts indicate the essential dynamic structuring of our very own being in its 
here-and-now thisness, i.e. these concepts try to express in a nonobjectifying and 
nonsubstantifying manner the assumed ineffable "full immediacy of the individual 
6 See here for example the existential-phenomenological investigations of Paul Tillich (1957) and
the overview of phenomenological 'voices' in the phenomenology of religion by Twiss and 
Conser (1992).
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human situation" (Kisiel, 1996). 
In short, categorial intuition is an important faculty inhering in the dynamic structure of
consciousness. This 'hidden' ability can be explicated and refined with the help of 
eidetic reduction into a philosophical attitude along the lines phenomenologists have 
investigated, and applied in almost any intellectual endeavor whatsoever. 
ORIENTATION C: PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY
§ 16. Division of Labor between Phenomenology and Psychology
Introducing the second part can be done most fruitfully with the following quadrant 
crossing philosophy and psychology with functions and history. 
 Functional approach Historical approach
Psychology A. Psychological and social coping 
mechanisms enabled by narrativity 
and narrative identity 
B. Evolutionary and developmental
aspects of narrativity and narrative
identity 
Philosophy C. Emplotment as the synthesizing 
activity of the productive 
imagination
D. Phenomenological archaeology 
of possibility conditions of 
narrativity and narrative identity 
Figure 2. Quadrant. Aspects of narrativity and narrative identity 
Square A in the quadrant is both historically and qua accessibility the first discipline. 
Extensive research in psychology is available on the many functional aspects of 
narrativity and narrative identity. Particular functions which have already been 
mentioned and will be mentioned throughout this study are: social cohesion, well-
being, coping, socialization, therapeutic healing, life-span organization, and 
transferring from one generation upon the next culturally specific concepts of 
temporality, causality, ethical standards and know-how. This last point of narrativity as 
a transmitting device for social practices segues into square B, which looks into the 
history of narrativity and narrative identity from two angles, one being ontogenetical 
and the other phylogenetical.7 The first is developmental and addresses the 
7 With 'genetic' I do not necessarily mean pertaining to biological genetics but pertaining to origin 
(genesis), though I would not be surprised if scientists would find a correlation between some genes
and narrative intelligence. 
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emergence and development of narrative intelligence understood as the implicit 
know-how of tacitly recognizing, following and telling stories in childhood (Nelson, 
1996).8 The second is evolutionary and addresses the adaptive advantage, 
selectionist history and possible origin of narrative intelligence. Narrativity might be 
the verbal extension of play, which phenomenon is observable in many species and 
teaches young members through mock-play some of the techniques necessary later 
for survival (Boyd, 2009; Dissanayake, 2017). 
In Boyd's study, stories, like any other expressive art, is a "form of cognitive play", 
which can improve the functioning of our minds; engender coordination and 
cooperation in groups; inspire creativity in individuals and groups to think beyond the 
bounds of the immediate; and socially elevate artists most capable in getting our 
attention to engage in cognitive play (Boyd, 2009: 381-3). Square C addresses the 
epistemological process of synthesis by which a story becomes constituted as the 
emplotted unity of diverse characters, actions and settings. Here the term emplotment
might be adequate to indicate that it is a dynamic and complex process by which a 
story's heterogeneous elements are synthesized by its plot, also named its theme, 
moral or 'point' (Ricoeur, 1984: 31-51 & 161-174; 1985: 1-44). Ricoeur explicitly, and 
Kant and Heidegger less so, make the point that the highly creative capacity of 
emplotment is lodged in the productive imagination, of which there will be much more 
to say (Ricoeur, 1984: 68; See §§42-46 ). Square D might be the most elusive and 
interesting, and would investigate the necessary layers of meaning formation 
constituting narrativity and in extension narrative identity. This kind of meaning 
archaeology Husserl named generative phenomenology, which he executed in an 
exemplary manner in his shorter work “The Origin of Geometry” (Husserl, 1970c).
Because the results from the work done in all of the four squares will come into play in
this study, I like to also make the point about how they are connected within a 
Husserlian framework. The relevant ideas here are 1) the connection between static 
8 In the Artificial Intelligence (AI) program the term narrative intelligence (NI) is also understood as the
sub-field analyzing and formalizing narrativity, and recreating in computer programs the 
computational creativity to write stories (Callen, 2017; Mateas & Senger, 1999). To prevent 
confusion it should maybe be named Artificial Narrative Intelligence (ANI), leaving the term (natural)
narrative intelligence to the developmental psychologists.
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and genetic phenomenology (§17) and 2) the transposition of scientific psychological 
findings into a phenomenological framework (§19). 
§ 17. Static, Genetic and Generative Phenomenology
Static or constitutive phenomenology investigates the structure and dynamics of 
consciousness (the how of experience) and its correlates (the what of experience) 
when relatively simple experiences are looked at in reflection, for example looking at 
a dice, remembering a friend's name, walking through a classroom or multiplying two 
numbers. Such acts of consciousness can all be looked at from inside out by a 
phenomenological investigator making fine-grained descriptive analyses of the act's 
structure and sequence in accomplishing its intention. The last example of 
multiplication might not be that simple and could be subjected to a genetic 
investigation trying to peel off the layers of acts and their products finding ever more 
deeper or originary accomplishments, which would constitute a stratified logic of their 
possibility conditions or synthetic a priori (Husserl, 1970c). 
Then there is an important difference between genetic and generative 
phenomenology, which can be easily conflated as both investigate the temporal 
genesis of our experiences, the first discerning layers of syntheses operative within 
one's own individuality, e.g. inner time-consciousness (§18), and the second 
discerning layers of meaning of trans-generational, socio-cultural accomplishments, 
e.g. the origin of geometry. To a large extent, and to make the difference clearer, the 
differentiation between genetic and generative phenomenology has its parallel in the 
differentiation between developmental and evolutionary psychology (§16). 
Concretely speaking the investigation, or "regressive inquiry" as Husserl named it 
(Husserl, 1970c: 354), would first ask what kind of underlying act is necessary for a 
multiplication to take place. And that would be the act of counting. To know how to 
execute the multiplication of 3*5 one has to be able to count 5+5+5. Next step is the 
question of what makes counting possible, which would be to know that numbers are 
ordered multitudes of single entities. So, the number five is 1+1+1+1+1. Next layer is 
to see what makes up the single entity of '1' and see that it is something that endures 
as identical to itself throughout a time-span. Then, what does it mean that a single 
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entity can endure? How is consciousness organized that it can keep a single entity in 
mind and see it as self-same throughout a time span while mathematical operations 
are executed? 
§ 18. Time Consciousness
The last question segues into the fascinating subject of the connection between 
consciousness and time. What could explain the experience of temporally enduring 
entities is the idea of a specious now, i.e. our experience of the present has a certain 
temporal thickness in which entities can endure for a little longer than the razor-thin 
extension the now could be abstractly conceived as. In Husserl's phenomenology of 
time-consciousness the holistic structure of the experience of the present is 
composed of three phases, which placed on a spatial time-line are (Husserl, 1964: 
51-56):
Retention – Source point – Protention
At the source point the initial stimulus enters consciousness, let's say the famous first 
four notes of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. Reflection on the hearing of this sequence 
will indicate that the notes do not immediately disappear after hearing them 
individually. Together they constitute a melody because the first note is somehow still 
retained when the second comes along, with which it combines, and then this 
combination is still retained when the third and fourth notes sound, all together 
creating an accumulative structure of retained notes experienced as a melody. When 
you hear the melody for the first time one might be rather more startled than hearing 
and appreciating the melody, but once it becomes a recognizable and reproducible 
musical meme in one's memory, the next time you hear the first note there will be an 
immediately filled protention of what is to come. This tacit protention has to be 
differentiated from explicit expectation. When I indicate that if you click here you will 
hear this melody, you will have the explicit expectation that you will hear that specific 
melody, but once it enters your mind the protentive phase at for example note #2 is 
not the explicit expectation of note #3. You then would hear two notes and that would 
interfere with the experience of the melody in its sequential enfolding. Still, because of
one's familiarity, note #3 announces itself at the sound of #2, but it is just-to-come or, 
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as Heidegger coined it—catching its paradoxical nature--right-now-not-yet (1997: 
234). A similar difference can be made between retention, i.e. the just-past or just-
now, and memory. Once you know the Beethoven meme you have an explicit memory
of it, which can be revived. But when you revive it, again at note #2, you will have 
retained #1, not as a explicit memory of it, but as the just-past note which combines 
with #2 creating a new unit, which in its own retentive phase will combine with #3, 
etc., till the final unit of the melody is constituted. Husserl named the difference 
primary and secondary expectation and remembrance (Husserl, 1964: 68f). Given the
above differentiations the temporal sequence of experience within its larger temporal 
framework is:
Memory - Retention – Source point – Protention - Expectation
Though this presentation of the structure of the specious now is based on an analysis 
of a receptive, passive experience of hearing a melody, we should remember that this
structure also provides the working space for the more productive, active act of 
multiplication with which this analysis started. Without this temporal space in which 
entities can endure to be manipulated by specific operations, such operations or 
psychological acts could not attain meaningful fulfillment. In other words, the essential
tri-phase sequence of intentionality (empty - fulfilled - identified) needs a temporal 
working space in which the emptily projected intention can be experienced as 
successfully fulfilled (or not) and both assessed in their sufficiency of identity (see 
§12).vii Otherwise there would be no possibility of planned action nor verbal 
comprehension.viii
§ 19. The Transposition of Psychology into Phenomenology
One of the aspirations of phenomenology is to reform certain areas of empirical 
psychology (Husserl, 1970b: 203-8 & 257-65; Kockelmans, 1967b). Their critique is 
that empirical psychology borrowed the methods and concepts of the physical 
sciences and applied them to the investigation of psychological phenomena. This 
would obscure the real nature of psychological acts. The most extreme example is the
school of behaviorism which considers whatever happens to a person from a 
subjective, personal angle as irrelevant and relegates the psyche to the status of a 
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black box. The only data relevant are measurable inputs and outputs and their 
correlative or causal relation. Phenomenology takes an almost exact opposite 
position. Instead of using the standard of mathematical physics they propose that the 
foundation necessary to make psychology into a rigorous empirical science is through
phenomenological reflection. This reflection would be executed by the psychological 
research community upon their own conscious acts, and abstract from such acts its 
essential structures and processes, which the researchers subsequently can express,
share, duplicate and critique. And with phenomenological reflection I mean the earlier 
mentioned sequential procedure of 1) bracketing--in order to suspend both one's 
naive, natural attitude and usual frameworks of understanding (in this case the natural
sciences)--and 2) free imaginative variation leading to 3) the discovery of essentials 
or relative invariant aspects of, for example, the first person, subjective experience of 
reading of a story. 
Phenomenology thereby rearranges the relationship between the relevant disciplines 
involved. It is not the case, as positivists would argue, that mathematical physics is 
the foundation of psychology, but that both physics and psychology have their own 
empirical, applicative aspect and a pure, foundational one. For physics the foundation
is mathematics and for psychology it is phenomenology (David Carr in Husserl, 
1970a: 260n4). The two-way exchange between phenomenology and psychology 
would be that 1) phenomenological insights could make psychology more precise and
2) psychological findings, done so in the third person mode, can be re-interpreted as 
accomplishments of consciousness accessed in the first person mode through 
emphatic imagination. For example, Ricoeur engages many narratologist who have 
made extensive contributions to the compilation, classification and logic of stories and
their plots, and then incorporates their findings into his phenomenology of 
emplotment, i.e. how the temporal synthesis of heterogeneity unfolds in a story-
reading experience and what basic elements can be discerned (Ricoeur, 1984: 31-51 
& 161-174; 1985: 1-44).ix
As far as internal differentiations within phenomenology are concerned I think a strong
case can be made that the previously mentioned troika of static, genetic and 
generative phenomenology have their parallel in act, developmental and evolutionary 
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psychology.9 Act psychology would investigate faculties like memory, perception, 
imagination, movement, language performance,etc. with the means of experimental 
psychology. Static phenomenology would look at the same activities from inside out 
as conscious accomplishments with its particular correlative-intentional, meaningful 
structures and dynamics. Developmental psychology would look at the developmental
arc of the acquisition of such faculties over a human's life-span, while genetic 
phenomenology would try to discern within one's own experience the layers of 
meaningful acts constituting complex, multi-layered experiences. Evolutionary 
psychology (and for that matter any evolutionary social science) would look at these 
acts and skills as adaptive mechanisms contributing to group fitness and cultural 
formations, and look for their origin and development over evolutionary time. 
Generative phenomenology would try to, emphatically from inside out, reconstruct the
complex, layered network of sedimented sense necessary for their collaborative co-
constitution. 
One important feature in this framework is the connection between evolutionary and 
developmental psychology in terms of the biological theory of recapitulation, i.e. that 
the development of the individual duplicates the development of the species, and its 
implication for the relationship between genetic and generative phenomenology. For 
example Nelson's 'ontogenetic' framework of a triple-staged language acquisition in 
individuals duplicates explicitly the framework of Merlin Donald's (1991) 'phylogenetic'
triple-staged evolution of human culture and cognition (Nelson, 1998: 59). And Ellen 
Dissanayake pointed to the importance of the long prelinguistic and preliterate 
evolutionary arc of humanity for understanding aesthetics and narrativity. 
If we recall that for 99 percent of their evolutionary history humans were 
nonverbal or preliterate, it then becomes clear that contemporary ideas about 
the nature and function of narrative or poetry will gain depth and richness if 
embedded in awareness of aesthetic predispositions that evolved during our 
long and influential prehistoric past (2011: 57).
This idea of cultural and cognitive recapitulation would then be the guiding template in
the relation between genetic and generative phenomenology by which individualistic-
9 See entries on "Constitutive Phenomenology", "Genetic Phenomenology" and "Generative 
Phenomenology" in the Encyclopedia of Phenomenology (Embree et al [Eds.], 1997). 
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developmental accomplishments in meaning-formation are embedded in communal-
evolutionary (or trans-generational inter-subjective) accomplishments. 
Although this looks like a neat one-on-one pairing of sub-divisions within psychology 
and phenomenology, it has to be pointed out that Husserl himself did not make this 
tidy categorization because developmental and evolutionary psychology had not yet 
been established and the demarcations and relationships between philosophy, 
physics, biology, psychology and other emerging social sciences were continuously 
shifting and proliferating in variations, even to this day, and doing so without 
academy-wide consensus. Husserl paired in his day generative phenomenology with 
cultural anthropology, which then was the science dealing with communal contexts 
shaped by trans-generational traditions (myths, rituals, arts) and "treats individual 
becoming within these geo-historical lifeworlds and addresses lifeworld communities 
as they transform themselves over the generations" (Steinbock in Embree, 1997: 
262). He also, throughout his thinking life, felt the necessity to re-arrange the scope 
and priorities between the three kinds of phenomenology, ostensibly settling for the 
generative one as the most encompassing and important (Steinbock in Embree, 
1997: 264). Based on my own experience I would make the case--parallel to 
Husserl's assessment of generative phenomenology as the most encompassing one--
that evolutionary theory in its contribution to the social sciences would be the most 
comprehensive theory deepening and uniting them within its own paradigm.x
ORIENTATION C: ADVANCED CONCEPT OF NARRATIVE IDENTITY 
§ 20. Introduction
The intention of this section is to compose a mid-level complicated concept of 
narrative identity constructed with the building-blocks provided by philosophers, 
particularly MacIntyre and Ricoeur; psychologists, especially Bamberg , McAdams, 
and Nelson; and evolutionary cognitivists like Donald and Boyer. Though there are 
quite some variations in the concept of narrative identity (Capek, 2018: 3), most do 
have some ideas in common which could constitute a set of corner-stones. At the 
same time, because my summary cum composition will contain some original tweaks 
in order to make necessary conciliations, the resulting product itself will be inevitably 
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one among the many variants of existing theories of narrative identity.
§ 21. MacIntyre 
Because MacIntyre arguably is the creative fount of the concept of narrative identity 
this section will start with his his concept, which was appropriated and further 
developed by Ricoeur with some elements anchored by the empirical research in 
narratology (Bremond, Labov & Walentsky, Jahn), personality psychology 
(MacAdams, Bamberg and Schechtman). developmental psychology (Nelson, 
Erikson) and evolutionary psychology (Donald, Boyd).
In MacIntyre's account personal identity consists of three equiprimordial moments: 
narration, intelligibility, and accountability.10 All three presuppose each other and in 
their unity stand in mutual presupposition with personal identity (218). MacIntyre is 
quite clear and adamant on this point. " . . . all attempts to elucidate the notion of 
personal identity independently of and in isolation from the notion of narrative, 
intelligibility and accountability are bound to fail"(218). In this opening section I will 
present MacIntyre's understanding of all three components and end with a possible 
re-arrangement of all three.
Narration
MacIntyre presents multiple arguments to establish the importance of narrativity. I will 
summarize here three intertwined lines of reasoning by MacIntyre making the claim 
that narrativity is important to understand 1) the unity of virtue, 2) behavior in general 
and 3) intentional planning. 
MacIntyre is concerned with virtue and its manifestation throughout one's life and its 
ipseic constancy, or voluntary commitment, throughout different situations.11 The unity 
of such virtue can only be evaluated within the unity of a life to assess its level of 
10 As MacIntyre draws deeply from Aristotle I suspect that the three equiprimordial constituents of 
personal identity have their parallel to, or possibly origin in, the three rhetorical appeals in speech-
acts: pathos (narrativity in its emotional impact), logos (intelligibility) and ethos (accountability). For 
the arousal of emotions in Aristotle see his Poetics (1941, ch. XIV-XV: 1466-70) and for the 
connection between narrative and the emotions see Keen (2011). Boyd considers social and moral 
emotions as the product of evolution. They are the "natural selection's way of motivating wide-
spread cooperation in highly social species" (2009: 58) and are usually aroused in stories thereby 
shaping motivations and actions into pro-social channels (2009: 287f)
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constancy, which can only be established in the unity of a narrative (205). To assess 
someone's courage is best done by telling that person's life story of courageous acts 
in diverse circumstances, preferably including moments of doubt and fear to create 
suspense and indicate its contingent, elective character. Not only Homer's Odysseus 
and the tales of the knights of the round table come to mind, but also the narrative of 
Gandhi's life as evocatively told in Freedom at Midnight (Collins & Lapierre, 1975). 
We cannot understand behavior without understanding intentions; we cannot 
understand intentions without understanding the social setting in which they occur; we
cannot understand such settings without understanding the agent's history and the 
history of the institution in which the behavior takes place; and no history is intelligible 
outside narrativity (206). "Swear faith to me and receive mercy" - "I will not swear faith
to a squire. Never". In Boorman's movie Excalibur the young, not yet king, Arthur 
hands over his sword to his enemy Sir Uryens, just when Arthur had him at the tip of 
his sword. Why? What was his intention? Well, he realized he needed to be knighted 
by another knight before becoming a king and Sir Uryens was the one immediately 
available. So, to understand and appreciate Arthur's act of supreme courage it is not 
only necessary to know Arthur's personal story (he was King Uther's son and had just 
drawn Excalibur from the stone), but also the institutions of medieval knighthood and 
kingship with all its rituals and social functions, which can best be understood in its 
complexities and riches when presented through historical narratives. Just stating that
knighthood is bestowed by merely touching a squire on the shoulder with a sword and
executing a speech act ("By the name of Saint Michael . . . ") will not do. Such a 
propositional statement does not capture the solemn, affective and historical 
dimension of the act of knighting. Only a narrative can convey that. 
A third line starts with short-term intentions, which can only be intelligible in reference 
to long-term intentions, which can only be understood in terms of one's longest-term 
or ultimate intentions, with the whole chain of intentions only graspable in a narrative 
history. And, as speech-acts are a form of intentional behavior, the same logic applies 
11 Ipseic is derived here from Ricoeur's use of the term ipse, i.e. the part of one's identity comprised of 
moral commitments to promises and agreements with others (§23). MacIntyre covers this part of 
one's personal identity with the concept of accountability. 
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to them. "Both purposes and speech-acts require contexts" and "become intelligible 
by finding its place in a narrative"(210). Again, young Arthur's behavior can illustrate 
this. He gives up his sword in-order-to be knighted by a speech-act, in-order-to claim 
kingship for-the-sake of the country, i.e. its inhabitants. But this only becomes 
intelligible when captured in a story. This analysis is obviously congruent with, and 
borrows terminology from, Heidegger's thought on how Dasein constitutes an 
intelligible world comprised of a field of possible involvements it cares about, which 
can be analyzed in terms of a chain of actions starting with a proximate "in-order-to" 
to a more encompassing "for-the-sake-of-which" with an ultimate terminus in, or back 
to, Dasein itself, either individually or collectively, for which sake this chain is 
executed (Heidegger, 1962: 116-9 / H84-6). 
MacIntyre then makes the switch from the epistemological importance of narrativity, 
which makes actions and discourses intelligible, to the idea that they are already 
narrative in their ontological structure in the first place. He now presents 
"conversations in particular and actions in general as enacted narratives" (210; italics 
added), because 
. . . we all live out narratives in our lives and because we understand our own 
lives in terms of the narratives that we live out that the form of narrative is 
appropriate for understanding the action of others. Stories are lived before they
are told--except in the case of fiction (212). 
MacIntyre's switch from narrative intelligibility to narrative identity is quite 
extraordinary and might find a parallel and elucidation in how Heidegger captured his 
hermeneutic turn in the profound and evocative phrase 'the hermeneutics of facticity' 
with its preposition read in a double genitive12 manner, but now paraphrased for 
MacIntyre as 'the narrative of life'. Just like we can read the phrase 'The love of God' 
as meaning both 'the love directed towards God' and 'the love inhering in God', we 
should read Heidegger's phrase as both 'the act of interpreting directed at our 
existential situatedness' and 'the interpretative nature inhering in our existential 
situatedness'. Before we even interpret life as if it were an object, it already has in 
12 Expressions like 'my mother's father's library' are usually called double genitive or double 
possessive. The expression 'the love of god' is a special case of double possession because the 
nouns involved are both possessor and possessee. Maybe instead of 'double genitive' such 
expressions should be named 'mutual possessive'.
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itself an interpreted nature as both its ground and product (Heidegger, 1999: 12f). 
Transposing this structure to MacIntyre, he goes from 'the narrative interpretation 
directed at human life' to 'the narrative structure as already inhering in human life'. 
Combining both Heidegger and MacIntyre, we can read:
The relationship here between hermeneutics [narrativity] and facticity [human 
life] is not the relationship between the grasping of an object and an object 
grasped . . . Rather interpreting [narrating] is itself a possible and distinctive 
how of the character of the being of factical [human] life itself" (Heidegger, 
1999: 12). 
This quote is lifted from the section titled "Hermeneutics as the self-interpretation of 
facticity" in which Heidegger succinctly formulated the program of his philosophical 
research: "Hermeneutics has the task of making the Dasein which is in each case our
own accessible to this Dasein itself with regard to the character of its being . . ." 
(Heidegger, 1999: 11). Another oft-quoted passage in Gadamer expressing this "pan-
hermeneutic process" (Kisiel, 2014: 5) can also easily be transposed from 
hermeneutics to narrativity, implying here that the latter might be the most 
comprehensive and natural form of the former: "Life interprets [narratizes] itself. Life 
itself has a hermeneutical [narrative] structure" (Gadamer, 1979: 199). And if "life 
narratizes itself" in the double sense of both structuring and expressing itself in 
narrativity then the sense of self that humans attain would necessarily be of a 
narrative nature. We live off, in and through stories. Some developmental 
psychologists would argue that even on a pre-verbal level at infancy one can detect 
narrative or proto-narrative structures in play and nonverbal parent-child 
communication.
Back to MacIntyre. Because we are social and historical beings the narrative aspect 
of our identity has multiple constraints and complexities. First, we are all characters 
also in each others narratives, which makes them at least the co-authors of our being.
Even before we are born we are characters in the narratives and identities of our 
predecessors like parents-to-be and educators-to-be and after we die we might linger 
as characters in the stories of our successors. Then our identities are also embedded 
as characters in concentric or overlapping rings in the historical narratives of larger 
unities like our family, generation, class, nation, etc., and most of these narratives 
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have already been in progress when we acquire our own role. 
We enter upon a stage which we did not design and we find ourselves part of 
an action that was not of our making. Each of us being a main character in his 
own drama plays subordinate parts in the dramas of others, and each drama 
constrains the others (213).
And once on stage our lived narrative has both an unpredictable and teleological 
character. Even though almost anything can happen and lives can go through 
dramatic turning points, at the same time we always have a sense of a goal or set of 
goals as the natural enfoldment of our narrative identities (215).xi13
Intelligibility
In MacIntyre 's account the concept of intelligibility is another basic term intertwined 
with narration and accountability. As presented above, narrativity provides intelligibility
to virtuousness, behavior and planning. All of these phenomena are temporally 
stretched and composed of multiple actions, in which each part can only be 
connected to the others as a "possible-element-within-a-sequence" with its own logic, 
context and motivation (209). For Ricoeur the understanding of a narrative sequence 
is made possible by understanding its overarching plot, which provides the narrative 
an intelligible unity with its own peculiar point or moral and in which its parts find their 
own temporally coherent position (§23). Applied to personal identity one can say that, 
at whatever life-span phase one finds oneself in, one's sense of current selfhood is 
not only formatted by the sequence of one's actions in the past, creating both 
obstacles and opportunities in the present regarding prospective actions in the 
future--which observation might sound trite and trivial--but, more importantly, it is also 
formatted by the consciously or unconsciously adopted plot schema from the stock of 
culturally available examples in living persons, biographies or fiction (212-3). Our lives
are not a chronicle of separate, discernible logical actions, which can be cleanly 
retrieved and analyzed in the present to make clear-cut plans for the future, though 
some people might see themselves like that. We almost all know life is more messy 
13 The above enumeration of narrative types is not only based on a derivation from the tripartite, 
horizontal structure of Dasein's temporality, but also from the three vertical positions of pre-
reflective actor, self-conscious agent and deliberative author as elaborated by both Jahn and 
MacAdams & Cox. 
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than that. Disturbing fears, unclear desires, preferential interpretations, self-imposed 
deceptions, ignorance and uncertainty enter the mix of selfhood, which according to 
the narrativists is only held together, and sometimes tenuously so, by one's life story 
plot. Absent this synthesizing ingredient our identity would, in the words of Erickson, 
become diffused, i.e. we would experience a loss of center, diminished coherence 
and fragmentation of roles resulting in different stages of confusion up to psychosis 
(1968: 212).
Accountability
Because human actions are "flowing intelligibly from a human agent's intentions, 
motives, passions and purposes" (209), humans should be able to be held to account 
for their authorship. MacIntyre finds this feature specifically pervasive in conversation.
It is in the thoroughly familiar context of conversations--a phenomenon he thinks 
escaped philosophical attention--that motivated actions become intelligible and 
agents become accountable (210). And not only do we exchange stories in 
conversations, but conversations themselves are "enacted narratives" in the sense 
that they are short, dramatic works produced by their joint authors and can be 
assigned genres like comic, tragic or farcical. They display all the characteristics of 
literary works. There is a beginning, middle and end; there are complications and 
resolutions; and longer conversations will have their digressions and sub-plots (211). 
And because conversation is the "form of human transactions in general", MacIntyre 
thinks what's true for conversation sensu stricto is also true for "battles, chess games,
courtships, philosophy seminars", etc (211). They are all enacted narratives for which 
we are accountable. MacIntyre stresses the reciprocity of accountability and its role in
constituting narratives when we do give accounts of our actions and underlying 
motivations. But also, by extension, conversations have an important role in 
constituting our identity (217-8).14 
14 At an empirical level this idea was worked out by Bamberg and his concept of 'small-d narratives', 
i.e. those that come into play in everyday settings like conversations (Bamberg, 2006)(see §24). 
Note: So, the practices by which a narrative identity is composed are, so far, autobiographical 
reminiscing (Bluck & Habermas), conversation (MacIntyre; Bamberg), and reading fictional and 
historical narratives (Ricoeur). Also Heidegger observed that it is in daily discourse that we present 
ourselves. 
34
Besides narrative identity having an intrinsic moral component of being accountable 
to others, it also has a teleological component aimed at what is good, which for 
MacIntyre equates to the question of "how best I might live out that unity [of a 
narrative embodied in a single life] and bring it to completion?" (218). MacIntyre takes
three specific steps to further flesh out this idea. First, the unity of life has the form of 
a narrative quest. Second, the quest is for the good. Third, the good is not only an 
individual good, but more importantly also a communal good. Therefore the unity of 
life is the unity of a narrative quest for the common good. And because a quest is 
quite open-ended in both the sense that it does not know where and when it will end 
nor what lessons will have to be learned on the way to get there, MacIntyre 
formulates his bit circular "provisional conclusion" as, 
. . . the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man, 
and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to 
understand what more and what else the good life for man is (219). 
In summing up one could argue that MacIntyre's concept of personal identity is a 
thoroughly contextualist one. Not only are social and historical contexts necessary for 
the intelligibility of personhood, but personhood itself is equivalent to its context. And 
because human contexts are not only intelligible within a narrative construction, but 
are equivalent to them, personhood is therefore of an essentially narrative nature. 
Appropriating Heidegger one could say that 'life is pan-narrative'. At the same time, 
and equally essential, is the idea that identity is thoroughly moral in the sense that 
humans always already act from a set of motivations for which they are socially 
accountable, that is, they should be able to give such an account, which is inevitably 
presented through narration. 
The component of intelligibility in one's personal identity does not seem to stand as 
independent as narration and accountability seem to be. It seems to be too closely 
intertwined with narration, as the latter in MacIntyre's account seems to make the 
former possible. This idea of the priority of narrativity over intelligibility is an idea more
explicitly pursued by Bruner (1991) and other cognitive narrativists. Here I will end 
with a similar idea that, at a deeper level of analysis, it might be shown that narrativity 
always already includes both intelligibility and accountability thereby making 
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narrativity the more foundational phenomenon. Narrativity has its own peculiar 
epistemological form in emplotment, which synthesizes disparate elements into an 
intelligible, narrative unity, and narrativity also has its own peculiar, intrinsic morality 
as every story has, explicitly or not, an evaluative point, moral or message. 
§ 22. Implied Narrativity in Heidegger's Concept of Hero
Before proceeding with Ricoeur's concept of narrative selfhood I like to dig into the 
concept of hero in Heidegger's Being and Time and this for two reasons. First, the 
concept can be fruitfully connected with narrativity because the heroism of a hero can 
best be captured in a fictional or historical narrative, and second, the two senses of 
hero used by Heidegger provide the perfect template for the two senses of identity 
used by Ricoeur. 
In the pivotal §74 of Being and Time Heidegger inserted a little phrase, "the possibility
that Dasein may choose its hero" (437 / H385), which can be interpreted both in a 
sinister, prophetic manner and also as possibly opening up the entire passage in 
which it occurs for a narrative turn (or narrativist exposition) with wider narrativist 
implications. Within this phrase it is the noun hero (Held) which becomes the anchor 
point for these two interpretations. The ominous interpretation has a prophetic bend, 
because we know that it was Hitler who was for a while Heidegger's hero and from 
whose authoritarian example Heidegger derived the idea of reforming the German 
university system along national-socialist lines, starting with the University of Freiburg 
where he became rector for one year in 1933 (Ott, 1993: 133f; Safranski, 1998: 225f).
The second interpretation is more wholesome in more than one meaning. The idea 
here is that a hero is first of all a character in a fictional or historical narrative and his 
or her heroism can only be understood as a sequence of deeds held together by the 
unity of a plotted story. This narrative exposition of Heidegger is most succinctly 
expressed by the German-American Yale philosopher Karsten Harries: 
The past needs to be interpreted. It has to be re-presented in something like a 
narrative presided over by a theme that binds it into a coherent whole and 
allows us to place our existence in that hole [sic!]. Heidegger does not speak of
a theme, but of the hero. The choice of a hero, I want to suggest, gathers 
history into such a whole, where the place marked by the word "hero" is left 
disturbingly empty in Being and Time and thus presents itself to us as an 
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empty vessel demanding to be filled . . . (2014: 169-70; bold in original). 
The above is not a summary by Harries of what Heidegger wrote in §74. It is his 
reconstruction by adding a clarifying narrativist interpretation. The further implications 
of this narrative twist for the whole of Heidegger's philosophy of Dasein and its how of
being-in-the-world can be summed up as follows. There are only two ways for Dasein 
to be in this world. Either it goes inauthentically along with, and immersed in, an 
average, everyday manner of understanding life in which the "they" (Das Man) has 
become its non-elected "hero" (422 / H371) or it extricates itself from this 
"everydayness" by realizing, in a visionary moment, its radical finitude as a mortal 
entity with a finite life-span, and resolutely appropriates a possible way of being based
on the template of its chosen hero. In both cases, in everydayness as well as in 
resoluteness, the exemplary hero is not a specific person to be imitated, but 
represents a field of possibilities set in a narrative structure to be appropriated by 
Dasein by calibrating this field for its own peculiar historical situatedness thereby 
creating wholly new possibilities.xii
The deeper points here are that historical figures (and some fictional ones as well; 
Davidsen, 2016) are not merely exemplars to be followed and seen as images 
exterior to one's identity, but that they are more of the nature of templates or 
schemas, not only containing their fulfilled projects in their own epoch, but also, and 
more importantly, but are also full of yet-to-be-realized, long-term, trans-generational 
opportunities which can be picked up and adjusted to expand one's own field of 
possible actions and thereby becoming a part of one's identity. Or, as MacIntyre 
expressed it, discernibly echoing Heidegger, "an adequate sense of traditions 
manifests itself in a grasp of those future possibilities which the past has made 
available to the present" (223). And such templates--as this line of reasoning took the 
word hero to imply--is of the nature of a still open-ended narrative. The emplotments 
inhering in our subconsciously or explicitly chosen exemplary, heroic characters, and 
the future-oriented traditions they embody, are essential constituents of our lives and 
identities. Again, one can play here with the double genitive character of the 
expression 'the story of Dasein', implying that we not only tell stories about Dasein, 
but that the manner in which Dasein is temporally unified is essentially the unifying 
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how of a story. 
§ 23. Ricoeur's Concept of Narrative Identity
During the long voyage of Ricoeur's quest for an understanding of human action and 
suffering within a hermeneutic-phenomenological framework a considerable stretch 
was dedicated to narrativity. First in his three-volume study Time and Narrative (1983-
88), which addressed the epistemological and formative role narrative plays in our 
understanding of action and time, and which also introduced the concept of narrative 
identity. And then in his Oneself as Another (1992), which developed this concept fully
in chapters five "Personal Identity and Narrative Identity" and six '"Personal Identity 
and Narrative Identity", initially as a solution to a set of problems arising from the 
question of "what specifies the self" and subsequently as a springboard into the 
connection between the narrative self and the moral self in three chapters addressing 
1) the self and its ethical aims (telos), 2) the self and moral normativity (ethos), and 3)
the self and practical wisdom (phronesis). According to Charles Reagan the "central 
thesis" of Time and Narrative is that "time becomes human time to the extent that it is 
organized into narratives and narratives are meaningful to the extent that they 
represent our temporal existence" (613). 
The basic template presented early in Ricoeur's study on time and narrative, and 
underlying its unity, is a three-fold mimesis or triple-phased circular development of 
cognitive acts. This series starts with 1) our tacit, pre-understanding of our world of 
action with its meaningful structures of motivated, interacting, goal-oriented agents in 
their communal settings of customs and institutions (Ethos); then 2) the interpretation 
of this world of agents and actions in poetic composition integrating and making 
meaningful diverse factors like agents, goals, means, interactions, unexpected 
results, etc. through the creative act of emplotment (Poiesis); ending in 3) the act of 
reading or listening in which the plot or message of the poetic composition might be 
received and understood with the possible effect of reformatting the reader's own 
understanding of how the world is plotted including a refiguration of one's field of 
action possibilities (Praxis). All three phases are narrative in structure, going from a 
tacit dimension of desires and actions already pre-figured by narrativity, to the 
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explicitly con-figured dimension of literary narratives, to end in the receiver whose 
world of action will get re-figured "under the sign of the plot" (1983: 77). 
Only towards the end of his long study on time and narrative does PR address the 
applicability of his three-fold mimesis to personal identity (1988 III: 244-8). First 
Ricoeur construes identity as a practical category able to answer the question of 
"Who did this?", which is not only answered by providing a proper name but also, and 
more importantly, by telling the story of the life belonging to the name. The "who" and 
its actions, about which stories are told, therefore "must be a narrative identity". 
Second, he differentiates between 1) a formal or substantialist part of one's identity as
those components which stay the same throughout one's life like certain bio-metrics 
and character dispositions (idem identity) and 2) a part which he names self-same or 
self-constant and equates with narrative identity, which "rests on a temporal structure 
that conforms to the model of dynamic identity arising from the poetic composition of 
a narrative text" (246). Third, one's overall narrative identity will change by adding 
new stories and re-interpreting old ones, and these changes will change the 
prefiguration of one's field of action possibilities, about which actualizations new 
stories can be told, creating an ongoing, dynamic circle. Ricoeur positively affirms this
circle to be, in its production of "chains of refigurations" throughout our individual and 
communal lives, entirely wholesome (248). "This [ongoing] refiguration makes this life 
itself a cloth woven of stories told" (246). 
But, because Ricoeur had not explicitly tackled the issue of personal identity in Time 
and Narrative and what role narrativity would play in its formation, this had to wait for 
this "Fifth Study" in Oneself as Another. His theory consists of at least the following 
basic propositions: 1) the self constitutes action and action constitutes the self; 2) 
narrativity holds both together; 3) narrativity mediates in the dialectic of our sense of 
durable sameness (idem identity) and our sense of changeable selfhood (ipse 
identity); and 4) narrative identity mediates the dialectic between Self and Other 
including a multitude of ethical implications (116ff,140ff, 317ff). Furthermore narrativity
has the epistemological virtue of providing listeners and readers "a vast laboratory for 
thought experiments" (147) to not only imagine alternative ways of acting, feeling and 
relating, which all could be appropriated and sometimes profoundly change its 
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readers, but also to perceive variations in the two modes of identity of idem and ipse 
to find out what components of self are stable and which can change. Narrativity also 
has the virtue that it bridges the realm of is and ought, that is, literature encompasses 
both the descriptive statements about characters and their actions, and prescriptive 
statements evaluating them, because actions always impinge on others who will 
either benefit or suffer (115 & 157). "There is no ethically neutral narrative" states 
Ricoeur and stresses again the lab-like experimental nature of literature "in which we 
experiment with estimations, evaluations, and judgments of approval and 
condemnation". Literature thereby becomes not only "a propaedeutic to ethics" (115), 
but its corner stone, because “the idea of bringing together life in the form of narrative 
is the only way to give a handhold to the aim of a 'good life,' the keystone of . . . 
ethics” (2005: 103).
Arguably the linchpin of Ricoeur's concept of narrative identity is 1) the differentiation 
between idem and ipse identity including 2) their changing relationship in the course 
of the individuation process. In the idem column belong our identifiable physical and 
character traits which usually endure throughout a lifetime. The physical self can be 
identified by objective criteria like its unique bio-metrics and physical marks. These 
are structures maintaining their self-same permanence in time (117). The habitual self
is composed of persevering character traits, sedimented habits and acquired 
identifications with values, norms, ideals, models and heroes (121-2). Though habits 
and identifications are acquired characteristics and therefore to a certain extent 
contingent, they will persevere if not tinkered with by deliberation, experimentation 
and resolution, which would re-open and possibly re-direct the identity formation 
process. This malleability, when engaged in, would signal the change from idem to 
ipse. In the ipse column belongs one's sense of self in acts like faithfulness to one's 
word and constancy of commitments (118 & 123-4). It includes a reflexive ownership 
of one's body, thoughts, relations and long-term projects. It is not a given like the 
physical and habitual self, but it is an achievement. It is not a thing-like real self but a 
capable self as a unity in action, i.e. an agent; and furthermore it is a narrative self as 
an emplotted unity of its life story, i.e. as both a character in (143), and a narrator of, 
its self-narrative (165); and it is the moral self as a self-constant unity guided by its 
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conscience and giving primacy to the Other (165). As Ricoeur pointed out himself 
(309n11) these two polar modes of being have parallels with the contrasting concepts 
in Heidegger of 1) the inspectable, substance-like, enduring mode of present-at-hand 
(idem) and 2) Dasein's self-constant mode of concerned being-with-others-in-the-
world (ipse). 
Another crucial aspect of this differentiation is that the ipse aspect is not something 
static. It is variable and arguably constitutes a developmental arc in a person's 
individuation or identity formation process set on a spectrum between two limits. At 
the lower limit point is one's loyalty to one's sameness in character and habits, which 
can be so enduring that it engulfs or covers over any sense of individualized selfhood.
Ipse would then be identical to, or overlap with, idem (121).xiii At the other limit point, 
and only realizable in a fictive "technological dream", is a sense of selfhood 
disconnected from any dialectical relationship to its sameness in corporeality and 
thereby losing any sense of identity (124). It is the brain in the vat scenario, which 
denies the fictitious person in question any physical integrity and environmental 
situatedness (149-51). In between is arguably a moral or existential high-point when 
one's moral self is committed to an appropriate ethical aim, appropriate in the sense 
that it takes into realistic consideration one's idem aspects like one's bodily and 
dispositional characteristics in both their enabling and limiting nature. For Ricoeur this
ethical aim is by definition "aiming at the 'good life' with and for others, in just 
institutions" (172).xiv
§ 24. Bamberg and Small-d Quotidian Discourse
While Ricoeur focused on the impact of historical and fictive narrations on our identity 
formation process, the American psychologist Michael Bamberg looked at the 
contribution of what he calls "small-d discourse", i.e. "constructions of self and identity
as necessarily dialogical and relational, fashioned and refashioned in local interactive 
practices" and "as a process of constant change" (2010: 14; italics in original). These 
practices are usually conversations in which people present themselves through the 
exchange of stories. Bamberg thinks such "moment-by-moment interactive 
engagements" are at best undertheorized and at worst dismissed and proposed a 
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research program using audio-visual means to record and micro-analyze the 
narratives and senses of self emerging from daily encounters (8).xv Bamberg identifies
three challenges or "dilemmatic spaces" which people have to navigate in their small-
d discourse "identity activities", all of which overlap with the ontological dialectics 
identified by Ricoeur.
The first dilemma is about degrees of unicity positioned between sameness and 
difference in the social realm, which overlaps with Ricoeur's dialectic between self 
and other. It is the tension between the desire to differentiate oneself from others and 
the desire to integrate oneself with others as far as group categories are concerned 
like ethnicity, class, nationality, age, friendship groups, etc. For Bamberg this is a 
dynamic, precognitive process, "shot through with . . . unconscious defenses", in 
which we experiment and negotiate versions of ourselves which might be accepted or
rejected (6-7).
The second dilemma to navigate is one's degree of agency in relation to the world on 
a spectrum between being sufferers and victims of a world determining us and--in 
opposite causal direction--being heroes in having a large degree of leverage over the 
world. This challenge overlaps with Ricoeur's dialectic of self and world, with the lived 
body on the side of self and the material body on the side of world. For Bamberg this 
dilemma is not an impasse or dichotomy but a dynamic process where one's sense of
agency might shift from situation to situation. How much we might feel boxed in by 
customs, genetics and institutions or find ways to transformative action depends on 
the leeway found in "interpretive discursive repertoires that preexist", which agents 
can appropriate and apply in their daily encounters (7). In short, the stories we buy 
into are formative of our sense of range of agency. 
The third dilemmatic space is about continuity and change of one's sense of self over 
time. This dilemma does not necessarily overlap with Ricoeur's differentiation 
between stable, idem identity and changeable, ipse selfhood. It is more about the 
developmental process ipse identity might go through in establishing its constancy in 
the face of continuous change. For Bamberg the establishment of such a diachronic 
sense of self happens "in the process of sorting out what events qualify as formative 
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or transformative for the emergence of identity", usually during adolescence (6). This 
sorting out of one's continuities and one's changes is not straightforward and it is 
again narratives which help navigate this challenging space, "because narratives are 
the genre par excellence for sorting out this diachronic aspect of identity 
formation"(6), especially, as others would point out, in coming-of-age stories. 
Again parallel to Ricoeur, Bamberg adds the ethical issue of orienting oneself towards
"the human good" (7; italics and scare quotes in original). Bamberg does not present 
this as a fourth dilemmatic space of identity formation because the three enumerated 
are "already shot through with valuating practices" (7). 
The more pressing issue for Bamberg seems to be how to think these three dilemmas
together as the identity formation process is not confined to any of the three spaces 
(7-8). The temporal specifics of these spaces provides a first systematization and also
a differentiation of the terms self and identity as used by Bamberg. Both the 
navigation of difference and sameness between self and others (the first dilemma) 
and the navigation of one's sense of agency between self and world (second 
dilemma) compose one's synchronic sense of self. These spaces are navigated on a 
more local and situational level. The challenge of sorting out one's constancies and 
changes over time (third dilemma) establishes ones diachronic sense of identity and 
would build upon the first two as its precursors and prerequisites (10). Establishing 
one's identity then comes down to "managing these three dilemmas in concert" (12) 
and would include assigning different narrative roles played out in the different 
dilemmatic spaces in terms of character and agent, and in its concerted unity in terms
of speaker and/or writer: 
A speaker/writer accounts for how s/he (i) has emerged (as character) over 
time, (ii) as different from (but same as) others, and simultaneously (iii) can 
account for how s/he views him-/herself as a (responsible) agent (12). 
From the above a hierarchical-diachronic relationship could be deduced of 1) first 
being a synchronic self or agent dealing with the world and others (combining here 
the two synchronic spaces), from which 2) a diachronic identity or character emerges,
about which 3) a speaker/writer can give an account. This sounds quite coherent, 
though MacAdams has a more elegant developmental model to sort out the 
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hierarchical and temporal relations between the narratological terms of author, 
narrator, agent and character and how they apply to narrative identity. 
§ 25. McAdams Stratified Model of Identity
Before discussing McAdams developmental model of identity formation I will present 
what seems to be one of his main proposals to integrate diverse models and research
programs in personality psychology under one roof. Together with Jennifer Pals he 
constructed a "comprehensive framework" of personal identity they named “The New 
Big Five”, which consists of five "fundamental principles for an integrative science of 
personality", as the subtitle describes it. In this model, or set of principles, the 
narrative component comprises an individual's most unique aspect even while 
integrating four other elements: 1) our inherited nature, 2) dispositional traits 
(O.C.E.A.N., which is the 'old' Big Five), 3) characteristic adaptations and 4) our 
social-cultural context. I will not discuss all five elements and their connections, but 
will provide the succinct, definitional conclusion and fill out the narrative component. 
Personality is an individual’s unique variation on the general evolutionary 
design for human nature, expressed as a developing pattern of dispositional 
traits, characteristic adaptations, and integrative life stories complexly and 
differentially situated in culture (212; italics in original). 
The definition, function and relation to culture of 'integrative life narratives' are as 
follows. These personal narratives, which are internalized and keep changing, 
integrate a reconstructed past and an imagined future such that a personal identity 
emerges which has unity, meaning and purpose. Individuals will differ as their life 
stories will have different qualities of tone, plot, themes and endings. Its function is to 
provide a person's life with meaning within one's culture and direction over time. And 
culture contains a stock of stories suggesting different life courses, which in the 
modern world have proliferated to the extent that there are now many competing 
stories among which we must choose some and disregard others (212). 
§ 26. McAdams Life-span Developmental Model
In this section I am making the switch from personality psychology to developmental 
psychology, and would construe their relationship as parallel to the one holding in 
phenomenology between constitutive and genetic analyses (§17). McAdams' and 
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Pals' 'New Big Five' proposal is arguably a synchronic model of human personality 
composed of five components build upon each other and interacting. Though the 
model has obviously room for the more diachronic component of narrativity, it did not 
explicitly formulate a developmental perspective. With Keith C. Cox as co-author 
McAdams broadens his integrative framework to include now the developmental arc 
of one's life span. And again, it is narrativity which provides unity to this field. Their 
innovative proposal is to see three consecutive stages, going from actor to agent to 
author. 
People begin life as social actors; eventually they become goal-oriented 
agents; by early adulthood, they add to their self-repertoire the retrospective 
(and simultaneously prospective) author (200).
Their paper especially appropriated William James' differentiation in the self between 
the 'I' and the 'Me' with the 'I' being the subjective, process-like self which through a 
reflexive act constitutes the 'Me' and considers its 'Me' as if it were an object for 
observation, evaluation and modification. This idea then is welded to the actor-agent-
author arc such that all three have their own subjective 'I' and reflected 'Me' aspect 
(1890). 
First there is the social actor-I who presents himself through performances like play-
acts, routines and social roles. Its temporal focus is the present. When the actor-I 
reflectively starts to observe its own performance and its effects on its co-actors in 
their capacity as critics and audience, it will build up a sense of its own level of skill 
and efficacy as an actor and thereby births the actor-Me. The actor-self with its 
concerns is in force throughout one's life and its greatest and ongoing challenge is 
self-regulation. "How do I control myself to generate the most effective performance in
my social world?" (200). We all have to play this game and are aware of our 
performances because the stakes are pretty high in the form of acceptance, 
reputation and access to resources like wealth, power and reproduction. 
When the self starts to channel its hopes and desires into plans and starts to control 
the process of their actualization the agent-I comes on stage. Its temporal focus is on 
the future. And when there is a sense of achievement and self-esteem it is the agent-I
feeling good about the agent-Me. "The I feels good about the Me to the extent that the
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me is perceived as actualizing, achieving, or making good progress in the pursuit of 
its most cherished goals" (201). Following Erikson here, McAdams and Cox see the 
agent-self play itself out in early adolescence in the spheres of ideology, occupation 
and relationships, and make consolidations in midlife focusing more narrowly on 
family, friends and health. 
The stage is cleared for the author-I or narrative identity to enter when young 
adolescents acquire the cognitive-narrative skills to connect their own relevant life-
events and relations into temporally ordered and causally linked chains, and also can 
detect unifying themes and plots in their personal development--the templates for 
which coming from our cultural stock. The role the author-I is to construct an 
internalized and evolving story of the author-Me, which would include "setting, 
scenes, characters, plots and themes" (201). Its temporal focus would be the whole of
its life, past, present and future, including its thematic or emplotted unity. This self-
story gives at least a modicum of unity, meaning and purpose to one's life and, as a 
task, is continuous, open-ended and is toward the end of one's life fragile and fallible. 
With culture serving as the ultimate editor and literary agent, the author-self 
continues to work on the story over the adult life course, revising, updating, and
sometimes recomposing from scratch, ever attuned to opportunities for self-
transformation" (201).
In summery, the authors identify three consecutive selves, i.e. actor, agent, author, 
which come on-line at different life stages (infancy, childhood, adolescence), which 
have their own peculiar capacities (performing, planning, emplotting), accompanying 
self-awareness and temporal focus (present, future, whole of time). 
§ 27. Katherine Nelson and the Developmental Phases of Cognitive Systems
The second developmental model comes from the distinguished American 
developmental psychologist Katherine Nelson. Her research focus was on the role of 
language in the development of children's cognitive capacities. She appropriated from
the evolutionary cognitivist Merlin Donald (1991) the sequence of four stages he 
identified in man's development of culture and cognition over evolutionary time. 
Nelson applied Donald's phylogenetic model to create her own ontogenetic model of 
cognitive phases, especially the early ones in childhood (Nelson, 1998: 74-84). She 
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distanced herself from classical cognitive theories "with their emphasis on the 
disembodied autonomous mind" (84) and allied herself with the enactive cognitivists 
like Varela, Thompson, Lakoff and Johnson, who see the mind as principally 
embodied and the body as thoroughly socially and culturally situated, and see that 
"individual cognition begins with experience and experientially based knowledge" 
(84). And the unit of analysis is not relations to objects, but events set in an "engulfing
cultural communicative society" (327). As far as spatial embeddedness is concerned 
Nelson sets the biological organism in its immediate socially constituted environment, 
which is in a mediate larger culture, which itself is set within the natural world (327). 
Within this setting the modern human goes through a temporal sequence of four 
cognitive phases named episodic, mimetic, narrative (Donald named this mythic) and 
theoretic. Though the episodic phase (0-2 yrs) is pre-semantic it is quite rich in 
cognitive structures in the sense of children's know-how of simple routines like 
bathing and eating, which are usually arranged and guided events. In the mimetic 
phase (2-4 yrs), which can include simple language use, more complex social 
activities take place like games, pretend play, simple plans and rituals. The structured 
richness of such events then provide the scaffolding for language acquisition. And 
initially language is used to reconstruct past events, or mark ongoing experiences; or 
plan future happenings. In the narrative phase (4-7 yrs) the storied mind emerges, 
which has narrative competence understood as the implicit know-how of tacitly 
recognizing, following and telling stories in childhood. Based on this capacity children 
also develop early on a "narrative-based autobiographical memory system" so they 
can share personal narratives (331) and only later start to create a self-narrative or 
life story, which is not yet the same as narrative identity construction. In summarizing 
the role of narrative in children's life Nelson wrote that, 
the account here is that narrative emerges from and belongs to the community,
but in the individual lives of children it is a vehicle through which consciousness
of both self and the wider social and temporal world becomes manifest and 
gradually emerges as a new subjective level of conscious awareness, with a 
sense of a specific past and awareness of a possible future, as well as with 
new insights into the consciousness of other people (Nelson, 2003: 33). 
During the early school years the theoretic phase starts when children grows out of 
their narrative phase and start engaging in arithmetic, reasoning, classifying, 
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abstracting and other complex operations. Enormously useful and under-theorized is 
the use of material externalizations of symbolic forms in written language, libraries, 
databases and now computers and the internet. Nelson discusses the idea that if 
narrative is the natural way of human knowing then rationality would be a derivative of
narrative, and as some argue, even inferior (1998: 184). 
Interestingly Nelson presents a little model of the progression and loop-back of the 
major cognitive phases which appears to capture the idea of the dialectic between the
implicit pre-verbal and explicit verbal realm, but now with an added differentiation 
within the verbal realm between folk and formal language. The two great transitions in
cognitive systems Nelson perceives are 1) the transition from experientially, pre-
semantic know-how of events and routines to an oral folk language system, and 2) 
the transition from this folk system to the formal, theoretic knowledge system.
Figure 3. Changes in conceptual representation systems (Nelson, 1998: 349)
These levels all feed forward and feed backward. Theoretic ideas slip back into folk 
language and folk language can guide and change routines.15
§ 28. Merlin Donald and the Evolutionary Stages of Human Cognition 
Going from Nelson's developmental model of cognitive phases to Donald's 
evolutionary model of cognitive stages should not be too hard as Nelson took her idea
from Donald in the first place. Therefore, besides some small differences, the same 
sequence of episodic, mimetic, narrative and theoretic applies to the phylogenetic arc 
of human development. In Donald's model episodic cognition (creating episodic 
15 One possible venue to explore is to connect her idea that language acquisition is intimately 
connected to underlying practical dealings, with Heidegger's crucial presentations in Being and
Time about the relationship between the acts of tacit understanding, explicated interpretation 
and formal assertion (1962, §§. 32-4: H 148-60 / 188-203).
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culture) is something we share with the primates and some other species and 
consists of the ability to perceive "complex, usually moving, clusters and patterns of 
stimuli as a unit" (Donald, 1991: 153). He considers such event-perceptions as the 
building block of primate and human cognition. Mimetic culture starts with Homo 
Erectus and builds upon and extends episodic culture. Mimesis is a higher form of 
imitation and mimicry, which enables the passing on of acquired skills like toolmaking,
coordinated activities like hunting, and customs like child rearing and social 
hierarchization. In short, mimetic cognition enables a "culture that was successful in 
inventing, transmitting and maintaining complex social and technological skills" (165). 
After a long transitional period between 300,000 and 50,000 yrs ago another shift 
occurred with Homo Sapiens from mimetic to mythic culture. Myths are the products 
of narrative and for Donald, following Bruner, narrative skill is "the natural product of 
language itself" (257; italics in original). Stories are not merely an aspect of language,
but is the way language is used as a form of cognition. For Nelson the following 
paragraph lays out the central point of Donald's thesis:
Narrative skill is the basic driving force behind language use, particularly 
speech: the ability to describe and define events and objects lies at the heart of
language acquisition. Group narrative skills lead to a collective version of 
reality; the narrative is almost always public. Thus, the adaptive pressure 
driving the expansion of symbolic capacity, the usefulness of symbolic 
invention, and the value of a highspeed speech mechanism with a huge 
memory capacity all depend upon the ability of the mind to harness these 
abilities toward the reconstruction of reality or . . . toward its construction in the 
first place (257).
Mythic culture is dependent on language skills for its maintenance and language is 
mainly used in narrative form. Narrative thinking is its organizational principle. This 
culture transits into theoretic culture when, with the help of writing and other external 
memory devices, analytic thought (or paradigmatic thought as Bruner named it) starts 
producing "formal arguments, systemic taxonomies, formal measurements, and 
logic", culminating in formal theory for prediction and explanation (Nelson: 70). Again, 
the tremendous assistance provided by "external symbolic storage (ESS) systems" in 
further developing theoretic culture seems to be overlooked by cognitive 
psychologists (Nelson: 72). 
49
Nelson and Donald do not say much about the role of narrative in the identity 
formation process of individuals. Nelson recognizes the social construction of self and
society (172) and the phenomenon of self-narrative (332), but I have not found any 
discussion on this topic. Others have made the move from the importance of narrative
epistemology to narrative ontology. It looks like that the developmental psychologists 
are not necessarily on board, even though they acknowledge the primacy of 
narrativity in understanding the world and ourselves. 
§ 29. Brian Boyd On the Origin of Stories.
To round out the evolutionary cum generative part of the role of narrative in cognition 
(and with poetic license into narrative identity) I will discuss the fruitful contribution by 
Brain Boyd, professor of English in Auckland, New Zealand. His leading question 
seems to be: How did life evolve such that it went from simple organisms instinctively 
reacting to environmental affordances, to humans with an understanding of space, 
time and causality far beyond their immediate here and now, all enabled by language 
with a leading role for story-telling to efficiently develop, share and transmit cultural 
practices and their justifications? 
Boyd ascribes to a multilevel selection theory and the idea that narratives help the 
evolution of cooperation as a transmission device of selected elements giving a group
certain advantages in their survival. “Selfishness beats altruism within single groups. 
Altruistic groups beat selfish groups" (52). Therefore groups which can develop a 
mechanism to contain selfishness within their own members will have a better chance
to beat other groups. This mechanism is 'social monitoring', which is done by mutual 
observations, stories and gossip. Stories enable collective survival strategies like 
mutualism, inclusive fitness, empathy and reciprocal altruism. Stories communicate 
norms, i.e. “shared memorable models of cooperation that stir our emotions” with the 
effect that we like to associate with altruists and not with “cheats and freeloaders” 
(64). So, stories can engender emotions of fairness and indignation (65) thereby 
shaping motivations and actions into pro-social channels (287f). Boyd sees art in 
general and narrativity specifically as an extension of play. Play has a tremendous 
adaptive value by developing survival skills through mock-play in youngsters of 
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almost any species to prepare them for serious adult life. Narrativity is then a form of 
“cognitive play”, which as a “human adaptation”, has the following functions. Stories 
“refine and retune our minds”, they raise the status of gifted artists (and their access 
to resources), improve coordination and cooperation of communities, and fiction lifts 
us up beyond the immediate to envision alternatives (381). 
Boyd seems to distance himself from narrative identity theory as he pushes back 
more generally against social constructivism and its resistance against applying 
evolutionary theory to human behavior. He sees himself as a biocultural evolutionist to
make space for the understanding of cooperative behavior and pro-social emotions 
which evolved before language was acquired and which were only further amplified 
and refined with the help of stories (23-30). In any case, the connections he made 
between narrativity and play are of great significance in their placement in the 
Kantian-Heideggerian mandala. 
§ 30. Rorty and Trans-generational Narrative Identity Development 
Somewhere between the long-term evolutionary story of language and narrative 
cognition, and the short-term life-span course of individual identity formation, lies the 
medium-term development of literature itself, including its impact on identity 
formation.16 Here I will lay out the main idea and the contributions from two individuals
in the way they highlighted larger or smaller chunks of this story. They are the 
American philosophers Amélie Oksenberg Rorty and Charles Taylor . The leading 
thought is that our identities have gone through changes in tandem with the changes 
in oral myths and written literature. If our identities are thoroughly socially constructed 
by the formative power inherent in narrative cognition, then it stands to reason that 
any changes in the plots, characters, evaluative practices and emotional evocations 
throughout the ages will have a profound impact on the manner we take the world and
16 Anthropologist and Jaynes scholar Brian McVeigh makes a similar point. "Mainstream, 
conventional research psychology typically utilizes two types of time: (1) developmental, i.e., 
the trajectory of the human life span; and (2) evolutionary or the unimaginably long passage of 
many millennia. But I submit that certain research projects demand a third type of temporality 
measured in several centuries (or in some circumstances several millennia). This mid-range 
type is better suited for understanding sociocultural adaptation" ( McVeigh, 2019: 5). McVeigh, 
Brian J. 2019. "Jaynesian Psychology: Misunderstandings and Methodology". Document at 
academia.edu.
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ourselves to be and what action possibilities would be open. 
 Amélie Oksenberg Rorty wrestled with this issue in her paper “A Literary Postscript: 
Characters, Persons, Selves, Individuals” (1976). She perceives an enormous 
amount of identity variations throughout written history and acknowledges that identity
theory is at an impasse, because theorists are very far from a consensus about the 
criteria by which persons can be identified. She wanted a history of the notion of 
identity and in her paper offered "a skeleton outline of some of the emotional and 
social spaces in which each of these move and have their being" (302). In very short 
order the development of identity formations throughout western history went from 
Greek heroic characters, for whom lineage and deeds were paramount marks of 
identity; to figures who are "defined by their place in an unfolding drama" (307); to 
persons as dramatis personae who know they are playing roles and have don a mask
and are also a "unified center of choice and action" (309); to inward directed souls 
and minds slightly detached from the world; to selves with legal rights and societal 
obligations; and to individuals as "indivisible autonomous units" feeling the dialectic of
individuality and community. She sees connecting links between the different 
conceptions--the themes of agency and interiority are pervasive-- but doesn't see an 
"underlying substance" (320). If there is an abiding theme it would be that "humans 
are just the sort of organisms that interpret and modify their agency through their 
conceptions of themselves" (323). Her proposed research program to still make some
sense of all variations would be to "investigate the biologically adaptive functions of 
the various cultural grafts: the obsession with unification and choice, salvation and 
simplicity, isolated integrity and achievement" (323). In short--and in congruence with 
the concepts of narrative identity and its evolutionary roots so far presented--Rorty 
sees persons and individuals (the neutral terms she uses to envelop the entire class 
of variations) as entities inventing themselves through self-interpretation within a 
cultural evolutionary context. In very short, identities are the product of adaptive self-
interpretation, which went through a series changes in at least the last 3,000 years, 
and its record can be found in literature. 
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§ 31. Charles Taylor and the History of Inwardness
The second contribution to this mid-range story of the cultural evolution of identity 
comes from Charles Taylor. In his landmark study Sources of the Self: The Making of 
the Modern Identity (1989) he addresses the historical development of how identity 
was experienced covering more or less the same time-span as Rorty, i.e. early 
classical Greece to modernity. Taylor, like Rorty, highlights the themes of interiority 
and agency and starts his story actually when the "inwardness" had not yet become a
part of a person's experience of himself and life. He observed that in Homer the locus 
of strength, inspiration, thought, and passions are fragmented throughout the body 
and were not yet to be 'found' in a unified mind located in the head. Taylor brings in 
the research by German philologist Bruno Snell, who wrote The Discovery of the 
Mind: The Greek Origins of European Thought. “Snell remarked on the absence in 
Homer of words that could happily be translated by our 'mind', or even by 'soul' in its 
standard post-Platonic meaning, that is, a term designating the unique locus where all
our different thoughts and feelings occur” (118). Snell found in Greek literature that 
there was a gradual change form the Homeric sense of bodily dispersed passions and
thoughts to the Platonic sense of a unitary inner mind. “Plato's view, just because it 
privileges a condition of self-collected awareness and designates this as the state of 
maximum unity with oneself, requires some conception of the mind as a unitary 
space” (119). Against expectation the language of interiority rarely used to make 
moral points (536, n7). That came later. With the Stoics interiority became the locus of
the will, which could give or withhold assent by choice (137), and in the Neo-
platonism of Plotinus the language of inwardness became more pronounced (537, 
n4). With Augustine inwardness becomes even more central and very complex as it 
became the place of the soul, the will, truth, God and moral development. Taylor 
observed that Augustine was “concerned not just with a turn away from what is 
outside, but with a search within” (537, n4) and quoted his famous line: "Noli foras ire,
in teipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas", which translates as "Do not go 
outward; return within yourself. In the inward man dwells truth" (129). For Augustine 
the inner/outer category becomes central and subsumes the other opposites of 
“spirit/matter, higher/lower, eternal/temporal, immutable/changing” (128-9). And the 
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unity and wholeness of the self is only to be found in God and not (yet) in itself, which 
idea culminates in Descartes. For him interiority is the locus of all thought as thinking 
substance, res cogitans, as opposed to res extensa, the spatial world of matter and 
one's body. Taylor considers the addition of “moral sources”, which were previously 
located outside in the well-ordered cosmos as an “epoch-making” and a “radical twist”
to Augustinian inwardness (143). Reason rules the passions and dominates a 
disenchanted world. Reason becomes 'disengaged'. The good life comes from one's 
dignity as a rational being (152). Descartes established a “new conception of 
inwardness, an inwardness of self-sufficiency, of autonomous powers of ordering by 
reason” (158) resulting in a move towards mechanism and treating experience as a 
vorhanden object. Another big step happened with the empiricist John Locke, who 
arguably demolished and rebuild the mind as a “punctual self” emptied from innate 
ideas and teleological impulses, i.e. the Tabula rasa. Locke “reifies the mind” and 
uses "metaphors to do with constructing and assembling stuff” (166). Ideas are 
impressions from outside to be treated as inert objects or propositional entities (164-
5). Its context was the rise of a disciplinary stance and practices with its “ideal of 
rational self-responsibility” (167). Enormously important for Locke's concept of 
personal identity is the role of reflexivity by which the self appears to itself. “Its only 
constitutive property is self-awareness” (49). The story continues with Hume, Kant, 
Schelling and Schopenhauer, who all contributed additions or made rejections to this 
ongoing concept of interiority. The arc more or less ends in the literary experiments of 
T.S. Elliot, Ezra Pound and Marcel Proust. Inwardness is now complemented by 
decentering (465). Decentering subjectivity epiphanies. The unitary self is no more 
and the focus is on the "flow of experience" and on language and its structures. (465).
The context is the ongoing Romantic reaction against mechanism, capitalism and 
industrialism (460-65). Meanwhile philosophers like Dilthey and Heidegger combat 
the role of mechanistic-utilitarian categories and turn from an idealized nature to the 
pragmatic life-world and try to retrieve experience from conventional, instrumental 
modes (469). The upshot of this extraction from Taylor is the idea that 1) not only the 
concept of identity went through many phases, but that all these thinkers both 
expressed and influenced how identity was experienced at a non-thematic, quotidian 
level, and 2) that these identity concepts highlighting interiority can be integrated into 
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a narrative identity theory, which Taylor himself subscribed to but not fully fleshed out 
theoretically (48-9). 
§ 32. Summery, Conciliation and Extension
The fusion of all of the above enumerated differences, variations, dilemmas, 
developments and dialectics as mediated by--or better expressed, incorporated in--
narrative identity might be best captured in the following paragraph: 
With the help of the culturally evolved organizational resources available in 
narration, humans are capable to cope with such a wide range of personal and 
collective opportunities and challenges that it became a sedimented cultural 
habit to be guided by the explicit courses of action, implicit standards of ethics 
and pro-social emotions inherent in narratives. And the formative quality of 
narrative can play itself out in stories which are either situational (MacIntyre, 
Heidegger, Bamberg), historical (Ricoeur, Hanegraaff), fictive (Ricoeur, Rorty), 
or grand (Hanegraaff). And, one step deeper switching from narrative cognition 
to narrative identity, it became a subconscious practice to take on (or slip in) 
types of identity provided by stories. This process of narrative identity formation
started hypothetically somewhere in the beginning of the very long process of 
humanity's language acquisition and can be construed as the co-evolution of 
identity and narration: the more complex stories could be told and followed, the
more complex our identities and behavior could be, and our increasingly 
complex identities enabled the production and comprehension of ever more 
evolved stories, together comprising a circular or spiral co-evolutionary 
dynamic of stories and identities.17 
This dynamic is guided by the Darwinian three-step logic of 1) phenotypic variation in 
fitness, 2) heritability of fitness and 3) selection by environmental factors (Lewontin, 
1970: 1), which applies to both the cultural evolution of stories and by extension to 
identities. In regards to the cultural evolution of narrativity these three steps can be 
filled out with 1) origin in creative re-composition of already told stories or re-filling of 
17 In Oneself as Another (1992: 149) there is a hint in this direction when he connects the loss of 
identity a character might experience and the loss of narrative configuration in modern 
literature. 
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already existing story templates, 2) stories being tellable, followable and memorable 
enabling transferability, and 3) selection of stories because of advantageous, mimetic 
applicability enhancing one's individual or group coping mechanisms. As far as 
identity is concerned we can line this up with the travails adolescents go through in 
their identity formation phase in which they 1) experiment with diverse identities as 
enabled by their cultural stock of stories (including counter-identities), 2) come upon a
sense of identity (or character) which can be sustained from situation to situation and 
therefore also be transferred from person to person, and 3) provide advantages in 
dealing with one's “phase-specific psychosocial crises” (Erikson, 1959: 128). 
As far as the temporal stretches are concerned at which narrativity is operative, a 
case can be made that between the long-term cultural evolution of narrative cognition 
over evolutionary time (Donald, Boyer) and the short-term life span scale of the 
developmental impact narratives have on individual identity formation (Nelson), a mid-
term historical time span can be inserted to look at variations of narrative structures 
and identity over generations (Rorty, Taylor).
Having filled out an advanced concept of narrative identity the following questions can
be posed. What is narrativity in and of itself? Does narrativity operate like a metaphor 
in the the identity formation process? How do metaphors transfer intelligibility from 
one domain to another? How does that work out when narrativity is metaphorically 
projected to the domain of personal identity and the significance of its life-span? Here 






The leading question of this section is how to understand narrativity 
phenomenologically, not only as a complex accomplishment of interwoven intentional 
acts with its own principle and recognizable constitutive synthesis of emplotment, but 
also in its multi-layered genesis going from the most elementary and simple acts of 
constitution to narrativity itself. This would mount to an archaeology of meaning not 
unlike Husserl developed in his investigation into the origin of geometry (Husserl, 
1970c) and as presented earlier in the discussion on the difference between static, 
genetic and generative phenomenology (§17). 
In this regard two French writers Ricoeur appropriated to specifically understand the 
concept of plot, became quite fruitful. They were the semanticists and narratologists 
Claude Bremond Elaine Cancalon and their paper "The Logic of Narrative 
Possibilities" (1980; original publication in French in 1966). Bremond and Cancalon 
(hereafter referred to as Bremond) tried to develop a logic of narrative roles, i.e. find 
an underlying schematism generating all possible combinations based on his 
understanding of a logic of action. 
Using his insights I will present the following opening stratagem: There arguably is a 
layered and hierarchical structure of enabling and constraining possibility conditions 
going from Intentionality to Post-Narrative Identity and its layers would be the 
following: 
1) Intentionality (§36)
2) Intentionality of action (§36)
3) Action Structure per Bremond (§34)
4) Narrative Character (subject + action) (§34)
5) Plotted Story (character emplotted) (§34)
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6) Life Story Schema (narrativity applied to life span) (§39)
7) Narrative Identity (story schema applied to identity) (§48)
Ricoeur appropriated from Bremond the connection between 3) and 4) and added his 
own 5). I add the connection 1) to 2) to 3) and the connection 6) to 7). 
Each layer has its own reigning logic and each connecting step has its own logic of 
derivation. When going from top to bottom one could call such a move archaeological 
and going from bottom to top one could name it constitutive. In phenomenological 
terms the applied kind of phenomenology is genetic, i.e. it looks how each level 
creates products through active syntheses, which then become the building blocks for
the next level to synthesize in novel ways, creating ever new products to be used by 
the next level (Husserl, 1970a, V, §14 & 41-3; Sokolowski, 1971: 325).
The sequence of analysis here followed starts with 1) Bremond's concept of action 
and 2) how that elementary building block can generate a table of narrative roles, 
which 3) then become the foundation for structured narratives. At the end I will go 
archaeologically from 1) action into 2) its underlying structure of intentionality of action
and to 3) intentionality tout court.
§ 34. Action Structure
Bremond provides the following figure depicting his elemental action sequence:
Figure 4. Bremond's Three-step Action Sequence (1980: 388)
Ricoeur's simpler version is in this figure:
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Figure 5. Ricoeur's Three-step Action Sequence (1985: 39)
This basic schema is used by Bremond to generate a logic of narrative roles by which
he can generate an exhaustive inventory of narrative possibilities of actions and roles.
The first differentiation is between 'sufferer' and 'agent' and their inter-action in which 
an agent's action results become the action possibility for the sufferer. Again, 
Bremond provides a simple figure for this logic.18
Figure 6. Bremond's Action and Reaction Sequence (1980: 388)
The following figure is a schematic summary of Ricoeur's representation of Bremond. 
The next differentiation Ricoeur zooms in on is whether the sufferer is objectively 
(physical or circumstantial) or subjectively (emotional or informational) affected and, 
correlatively, what an agent might have done to make that happen. This table 
acquires further differentiations with considerations whether 1) actions resulted in a 
change or not in the circumstances of the sufferer and 2) if, when there is a change, 
the change is an amelioration or deterioration. Though not all possibilities fit in to 
illustrate the symmetry between sufferer and agent, it gets quite close to “a table of 
possible places occupied by the contingent characters of contingent narratives” 
(Ricoeur, 1985 II, 41).
18 Based on Mandler (1984) McAdams sees a triple-phased sequence as what five-year-olds 
would already understand as a “conventional story grammar”. The sequence would be action-
consequence-reaction. “In a simple, goal-directed episode, for example, an initiating event may
prompt the protagonist to attempt some kind of action, which will result in some kind of 
consequence, which in turn will be followed by the protagonist’s reaction to the consequence” 
(McAdams, 2011: 105; italics in original).
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Figure 7. Inventory of Principal Narrative Roles. 
In Bremond's 1980 Postface he rearranged his categories in a more "economical" set 
of tables with the help of "Aristotle's Square".19 His diagram of "essential narrative 
schemata", which he also calls his "basic armature", combines the descriptive 
categories of sameness and change with the prescriptive categories of favorable and 




Figure 8. Basic Armature of Essential Narrative Schemata (Bremond: 407) 
Though Bremond provides an almost exhaustive table of actions and most of those 
imply an evaluation by both the agent and the sufferer and thereby would solicit a 
reaction, this is still insufficient to constitute the full sense of narrativity. Ricoeur thinks
that this inventory does not yet constitute a logic of narrativity. To know all the 
19 This is not entirely correct as Aristotle's Square has to do more with logic than categorization. 
Bremond's diagrams are closer to what I name 'quadrants' and Hanegraaaf describes as 
"double polarities".
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possible roles which can be assumed by narrative characters "is not yet to know any 
plot whatsoever" (1984: 43; italics in original). What is still needed is to have a 
sequence of actions and reactions configured according to our stock of plot-types. 
Ricoeur refers to Arthur Danton here and his idea that a narrative needs at least two 
actions: a first initiating action and then a second action, which both evaluates and 
reacts to the first. According to this criteria the above figure x by Bremond actually 
does constitute a minimal narrative of two connected actions. It starts with an evil 
deed performed and then there is a deed of avenging the first deed, which implies a 
motivational evaluation.20 
To be fair to Bremond, he does mention the logic of narrativity through a plotted 
sequence of events. "All narrative consists of a discourse which integrates events of 
human interest into the unity of a single plot" (390). His explicit conditions of 
narrativity are a) succession of events or sequence, b) integration into a structure, i.e. 
a plot, and c) a human interest or plan. "for it is only in relation to a plan conceived by 
man that events gain meaning and can be organized into a structured temporal 
sequence".
§ 35. Parallel with Labov
This three-phased sequence dovetails with the structure of everyday stories which 
Labov & Waletzky (1967) found, though this requires a little elaboration based on a 
more detailed presentation of Labov's narrative model.21
Labov considered narrative serving two purposes. First, it is a technique used by a 
narrator to construct linguistic units which would match his or her personal 
experiences, especially its temporal ordering. Secondly, it expresses a personal 
interest or point of view which makes the narrative socially salient. The first function is
referential and the second is evaluative (4).
The smallest units of linguistic expression they named clauses, which are simple 
20 It is not clear why Ricoeur overlooked Bremond's action and reaction sequence. Both the simple 
and the action-reaction sequence were depicted on the same page in Bremond's paper. 
21 The paper can be seen as a great example of finding 'invariants' through the technique of free 
imaginary variation. Though I am sure that Husserl did not have a monopoly on this procedure, 
once one is familiar with it, it can be easily recognized in its procedure and clear results. . 
61
phrases, and the smallest unit of a narrative would consists of any “sequence of 
clauses that contains at least one temporal juncture” (21) of the form a-then-b. This 
minimal structure is congruent with Bremond's and Ricoeur's minimal narrative action 
sequence. The example used given is:
(1) a I know a boy name Harry.
b Another boy threw a bottle at him right in the head,
c and [then] he had to get seven stitches.
All three units are clauses and the switch between b and c is the temporal 
conjunction, illustrated by the insertion of the adverb then, which makes this 
sequence a narrative. If clauses b and c were switched and connected silently or 
explicitly by the conjunction because, Labov would not consider it a narrative.
(2) a I know a boy name Harry.
b He had to get seven stitches,
c [because] another boy threw a bottle at him right in the head.
Paragraphs (1) and (2) contain the same clauses and the same information, but 
because of its sequential temporal structure (1) is a narrative and because of its 
systemic structure (2) is an explanation. Both are related with the idea that 
traditionally narrative is seen as a simpler and inferior kind of explanation, though 
some would challenge that idea and see explanation as actually a derivative of 
narrative and inferior in explanatory power (see below). Labov concluded that “the a-
then-b is in some sense the most essential characteristic of narrative” (25).
But (1) is still not a full narrative because it lacks the element of evaluation, the point 
or 'so what?' of the story. The evaluative element can be found if a separate clause 
would have been added like “that must have been terrible” or in a more subtle manner
through intensifiers like, for example, accentuating the word seven to indicate the 
narrator's point of the story, i.e. how badly Harry was hurt.
To illustrate with the help of the above example how a full narrative would look like 
one could add an Abstract like "Some people get badly hurt"; an Orientation like "Last 
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summer in New York"; and a Coda like "And ever since I kept an eye on Harry". The 
story would then flow as follows:
Some people get badly hurt. Last summer in New York I knew a boy named 
Harry. Another boy threw a bottle at him right in the head and he had to get 
seven stitches. Ever since I kept an eye on Harry.
The diagram drawn by Labov to illustrate the “normal form of narrative”, which most 
narratives exactly duplicate, is as follows:
Fig. 9. The normal form of narrative (1967: 37)
The arrow indicates the point where both the narrative started and finished, that is, 
with the narrator. The Abstract and Coda are optional; the Orientation is usually 
included, but could be silenced without hurting the point of the story. The 
Complication – Evaluation – Resolution sequence is the essential core. Take out any 
of these three and there is no story.
One can delete the Orientation and Coda clauses without damaging the nature of a 
story. These are independent parts, because one can leave out the historical dating 
and geographical placing of the narrative context as well as the names and 
backgrounds of characters and still have a story to tell. But one cannot get rid of the 
Complication - Evaluation - Resolution sequence and still have a followable story. 
These are the dependent moments of a story. Take out one and the story falls apart. 
And the element hardest to eliminate by imaginary variation is the evaluation. Within 
Bremond's typology the evaluative element is already baked into the action sequence.
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Agents persuade, esteem, ameliorate, protect, etc. and the sufferers experience the 
positive or negative consequences. There is hardly anything evaluative neutral or 
purely descriptive about such actions. The evaluative element can be made explicit, 
but not eliminated. Compare for example the following two versions of the same story:
1) The captain insulted the officer. The officer was very offended. The officer 
struck the captain. 
2) The captain insulted the officer. The officer struck the captain. 
By leaving out the explicit evaluative clause of "The officer was very offended" the gist
of the story does not change much. That the officer would be offended is first made 
possible by the captain's insult and then firmly implied in the officer's reaction. But the 
fact that the officer was offended and that the offense was the motivation to strike was
never stated as such. And even if one would formalize the story to its bare bones, our 
sense of plot and its inherent evaluative element would still kick in when we would 
read for example:
3) A said X to B then B did Y to A.
Our narrative intelligence (our implicit capacity of being able to follow and tell stories) 
just gets triggered and will project possible plot lines and concrete images to flesh out 
the sequence of skeletal clauses. This spontaneous capacity, similar to and building 
upon our naturally evolved agent detection bias--usually discussed in the context of 
explaining the belief in God (Gray & Wegenr, 2010: 9-11)--could be seen as our 
socially evolved plot detection bias, which could be named Hyperactive Plot Detection
Device. There has to be a story, peopled by agents, and it has to be intelligible in 
terms of sequence and evaluation. 
§ 36. Intentionality of Action 
To connect Bremond's concept of narrative action with the phenomenological concept
of intentionality we can start with Ricoeur's more simple action sequence of 'possibility
- passage - completion' and construe it as a variation of the phenomenological 
concept of action with its intentional structure and dynamics. An intentional analysis of
deliberative action would result in the sequence of a) a deliberately planned and 
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projected practical possibility, b) executed through a set of pre-reflective skills with, if 
necessary, rational guidance till fulfilled, which c) can be identified as successful if 
and when the projected and actualized state of affairs coincide.
To compose a table of elementary kinds of action I propose for a basic and first 
differentiation to distinguish between instinctive, habitual and deliberative actions, for 
which the intentional analyses would go thus. In the case of an instinctual and 
automatic action there is initially a) a perception of an affordance (food, drink, 
security, procreation), b) triggering an instinctual pursuit of this affordance, till c) there 
is satisfaction when fulfillment is commensurate to the urge. In the case of habitual 
action we deal with a) a pre-reflective perception of a possibility, b) allowed to be 
executed almost immediately and is c) completed when possibility and actualization 
coincide. The short analysis of deliberative action was already given above.22
All these action intentionalities are a variation of the basic pattern of intentionality, as 
already presented in §12, of any experience whatsoever going from a) empty 
intending (urge, possibility, plan), to b) fulfilling (execution) and to c) identity or 
bringing-in-coincidence in different degrees of agreement of desired state with actual 
state, going from frustration (distinction, Entscheidung) to partial fulfillment to total 
fulfillment (Husserl, 1970a, VI, §§10-12: 210-15; See also Appendix X).
§ 37. Narrativityxvi
Before moving on with a discussion on how narrativity might apply to one's life span, 
a little refresher on the definition of narrativity so far assumed might be helpful. 
A Narrative is a complex linguistic construction incorporating many and diverse 
elements of human life like events, complications, perspectives, evaluations, etc., in a
tellable and followable story format, which dynamically moves along with a beginning, 
middle and end, and all held together by its plot.
Polkinghorne gives the following definition: “Narrative is the cognitive process that 
gives meaning to temporal events by identifying them as parts of a plot” (1991: 136) 
22 This differentiation I found initially in Arnhart (2009; see per. x) with confirmation in the work on 
action by French phenomenologist Elizabeth Pacherie (2008, 2011, 2012).
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and Nelson's goes as follows: 
Narrative is the unfolding of events through time as told from a particular 
perspective of time, person, and situation, involving a departure from expected 
canonical happening of events that requires reflection and explanation; and it 
may explicitly or implicitly recapitulate recurrent enduring, perhaps universal, 
themes of cultural significance. The microstructure of a narrative emerges from
macrostructure as the parts from the whole, bound by narrative devices of 
discourse grammars” (Nelson, 1996: 189). 
§ 38. The Role of Categorial Intuition in Emplotment 
In this little section I will make a further connection between intentionality and 
narrativity by interpreting the imaginative procedure of emplotment in terms of 
categorial intuition. The phenomenological question to address here is how categorial 
intuition plays a role in the act of emplotment, i.e. what is its contribution to narrative 
composition?23 Take the example of one of the most famous short stories, one which 
was attributed to Ernest Hemingway.24 "For sale: baby shoes, never worn". This story 
not only contains at the implicit level an enormous amount of images, associations, 
emotions and practical understandings, but also, and most importantly, the hidden 
structure of a narrative. First there is the implied orientation of a mature female, 
probably a part of a couple; then the initial complication of this person becoming 
pregnant, which justified practical preparations like the purchase of baby shoes; then 
the maximum complication of an abrogation of the pregnancy, which is blended with 
the evaluation of its tragic nature and the subsequent resolution of putting the baby 
shoes up for sale through an advertisement. The particularity of this story is that only 
the resolution is presented and that we, as recipients of the story, are able to more or 
less infer the whole story and its plot by our acquired narrative intelligence, i.e. the 
tacit skill to turn fragments and incomplete information into a narrative.25 This is what 
Ricoeur named emplotment and is also enabled by the configuring activity of the 
23 Initially I thought that metaphors and emplotments could be seen as extended or complicated forms 
of categorial intuition, but, after getting the knack of the role of productive imagination in the pre- 
and con-figuring of any meaningful experience whatsoever, I had to conclude that metaphors and 
emplotments are not variations of categorial intuition, but do built upon its products and that it is the 
productive imagination which provides in all instances their peculiar form of intelligibility.
24  For discussion of origin of the story see Haglund (2013).
25 Note: This analysis could be expanded with "Kaplan's machinery" of transforming utterances into full
propositional statements with the help of contextual or implied clues (Schuller, 2014). 
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productive imagination. And what the imagination configures through emplotment are 
identifiable elements, which can be expressed in full propositional form as simple 
states of affair, like 'she/they got pregnant', 'she/they obtained baby shoes', 'she/they 
lost the baby', 'to lose a baby is sad', 'she/they placed an advertisement', etc. All these
simple, elemental states of affair express what categorial intuition already observed to
be the case, either in real life, for example a person composing a first-hand report, or 
in one's fictive imagination, as we add narrative configuration to the minimal six-word 
story. 
§ 39. Narrativity and life Span Coherence
A pivot point in this research, as it opened the road back to Kant, came with the twin 
papers "The Life Story Schema" (Bluck & Habermas, 2000) and "Getting a Life: The 
Emergence of the Life Story in Adolescence" (Habermas & Bluck, 2000) by two 
developmental psychologists, the American Susan Bluck and the German Tilmann 
Habermas. They made a clear differentiation between on one side the explicit 
autobiographical memories we mull over in our heads (autobiographical reminiscing) 
and those we tell others about our lives (life narratives), and on the other side the 
implicit, mental organization or template underlying and enabling the production of 
such manifest, linguistic self-narratives and autobiographical memories. They named 
this non-manifest capacity the Life Story Schema and conceived it as the crucial 
connector between one's sense of self and one's autobiographical memories. This 
schema is both the storage room of "a skeletal version of one's life" (128) and the 
principle connector of the salient components of one's life like specific events, lifetime 
periods and recurring themes. It also acts as an arbiter in retrieving and inter-
connecting specific memories when engaged in explicit life narrations. It pre-
structures such narratives and stays relatively stable throughout one's life as it gets 
only gradually upgraded "as life is being lived" (127). Some autobiographical 
memories become more charged, others fade away. The point is that the Life Story 
Schema is more or less hidden in the tacit dimension and its structure can only be 
inferred from the explicit self-narratives and memories it helps to produce. It can 
never attain full manifestation. Again, its organizational structure is more abiding than 
the products it enables: 
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The ancillary episodes and interpretations that are selected for inclusion at any 
particular time are guided by situational norms and will depend on the reason 
for producing the narrative on that occasion. After the narrative is completed, 
the mental representation (the life story schema) persists, whereas no 
representation of the specific life narrative just produced lingers permanently 
(126).
Bluck & Habermas inferred a four-fold cognitive capacity operative in the Life Story 
Schema providing coherence in one's self-narrative activities, especially during the 
identity formation process in adolescence. They identified two basic, "skeletal" 
cognitive competencies or coherences. 
One is temporal coherence, i.e. the capacity to order life's events in a temporal order 
and how events might be connected (130-1). It provides a temporal record of one's 
life as a whole, especially as far as it is organized by one's motivations and 
attainment of goals. This temporal coherence can also act as a source of resilience in 
times of change and challenge. 
The second skeletal coherence is the gradually acquired "cultural concept of 
biography" (131-2), i.e. a normative template for what culturally counts as important 
events and conventional life phases, and when they are supposed to be experienced. 
This template of cultural coherence will vary in different cultures, classes and between
genders. 
The next two more individualized competencies would form one's individual 
uniqueness. The first is causal coherence providing a template of the specific reasons
and explanations how events and episodes in one's own phase of life are causally 
connected. It is a tacit understanding enabling the more explicit "explanations of one's
own developmental trajectory and particular life changes" (133). It provides an 
ordered sense of continuity to one's life by linking events. 
The second also more individual organizational principle is thematic coherence, i.e. 
the ability to see recurring themes or even an overall theme in one's life and give life 
an overall meaning (132). This underlying coherence can be inferred in its specifics 
when people make evaluative statements about their lives or capture their lives in a 
central metaphor like "My life is a voyage" or a one-liner like "My life has been a 
series of ups and downs". 
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In their summary it becomes clear that the organizational principle they find operative 
in the production of life narratives is nothing less than the imaginative capacity of 
emplotment as conceptualized by Ricoeur.
The Life Story Schema draws on important memories of life events, but goes beyond 
that by linking events temporally and interpretively into a story of one’s life. In doing 
so, it binds self and memory: This schematic representation of one’s life events over 
time connects the present self with the personal and unique history and changing 
contexts of the individual. The life story schema provides an individualized, flexible 
history of the self that preserves self-continuity across roles and motivates future 
actions and goals (141). 
Both the organizational principle comprising the Life Story Schema and the 
imaginative synthesis operative in emplotment aim at a thematic, plotted, flexible, 
dynamic, holistic structure giving coherence to its components and when applied to 
one's life span giving it meaning, context and direction. And both concepts have a 
deep background pointing back to Kant and his concept of the transcendental faculty 
of imagination. 
But before traveling that route a presentation is necessary of how something like a 
Life Story Schema is not only operative in one's identity formation process as an aid 
to build one's life story, but also, one step further, might be construed as the 
organizational principle of narrative identity itself. In the conceptualization of Bluck & 
Habermas one has a Life Story Schema (mediating between self and memory), while 
arguably in narrative identity theory one is one's Life Story Schema enabled by a 
metaphorical projection of narrativity into identity. How that projection might occur 
necessitates a deeper understanding of metaphorical cognition. 
COMPLICATION B: METAPHOR
§ 40. Metaphorical Cognition
The idea leading into this section about metaphoricity is that narrative identity is 
enabled by a metaphorical projection of the intelligibility inherent in the domain of 
narrativity into the more elusive domain of one's temporary self and life-span identity. 
69
The definition of metaphor is that it is an innovative figure of speech in which a word 
or phrase from a familiar source domain is applied to an object or action in a more 
abstract or complex target domain to which it is not literally applicable but still 
provides some clarification (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
A metaphor may thereby provide clarity by identifying hidden similarities between the 
two domains. And because most terms come with a host of alternative definitional 
meanings and associated properties, powers and relations, they may also create 
intended literary flourishes or unintended confusion. 
The terminology, definitions and example could be organized in this table. 
Term Definition Example
Metaphor An innovative figure of 
speech 















Properties, powers and 
relations associated with a 
metaphier






Properties, powers and 
relations projected unto the 
metaphrand
The earth 'sleeping' while 
covered; promise of 
awakening in spring
Fig. 10. Composition and logic of Metaphor 
An introductory example is the phrase “The snow blankets the earth” taken from 
Jaynes (1976: 57). With the terminology and definitions provided by Jaynes and 
Richards (1965) one can say that 1) the full expression is a metaphor; 2) the term 
used figuratively is the verb to blanket; it is the vehicle or metaphier transferring 
meaning to 3) the state of affairs the figurative term is applied to, in this case the 
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relationship between snow and the earth it covers (the tenor or metaphrand); 4) in the
process explicit and implicit meanings like protection, sleep and warmth (paraphiers) 
are projected from the vehicle to the tenor creating new meanings, in this case the 
idea of the earth 'sleeping' while covered and a promise of awakening in spring 
(paraphrands).
Arguably George Lakoff and Mark Johnson were the pioneers in analyzing the 
pervasive cognitive qualities of metaphors in their 1980 Metaphors We Live By. Later, 
in their groundbreaking Philosophy in the Flesh (1999), they presented a integrated 
theory comprised of four basic elements. 
The first element is Johnson's theory of conflation. Young children initially conflate on 
one hand their subjective experiences and verbal judgments with on the hand 
sensorimotor experiences. For example the experience of warmth and affection are 
easily conflated. Later they will learn how to differentiate these domains, even while 
the "cross-domain associations" will endure and form the basis for later, easy to 
understand expressions like a "warm smile". 
The second element is the theory of primary metaphor, i.e. the idea that all complex 
metaphors are composed of smaller, simple primary metaphors, which are grounded 
in simple sensorimotor experiences. For example Understanding is Grasping is a 
primary metaphor in which the subjective act of comprehension is conceived in terms 
of the sensorimotor experience of object manipulation (54). 
The third part is the neural theory of metaphor, which looks at simultaneous neural 
activities in, and neural connections between, different regions of the brain in which 
different conceptual and sensorimotor domains are lodged. 
The fourth is the theory of conceptual blending pioneered by Fauconnier and Turner 
(2002). They added to the source and target domain model of metaphors a “Generic 
Space” and a “Blending Space” in the middle creating thereby a “Four Space Model”.
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Figure 11. The Fauconnier-Turner “Four Space Model” (2002)
Analogies, metaphors and many, if not all, other cognitive operations involve the two 
extra spaces. They are relevant partial structures mediating between source and 
target. The Generic Space contains skeletal, abstract elements like roles, frames and 
schemas common to both source and target domain. The Blended Space combines 
richer, more detailed specifics from source and target domains creating often 
impossible and counter-factual images. They posit that it is in the Blended Space that 
contradictory schemas are sorted out as far as applicability is concerned, yielding new
meanings only to be experienced as a "flash of comprehension" (44). The processes 
involved are fast, subconscious and semi-automatic. 
The integrated theory--the four parts together--has an overwhelming 
implication: We acquire a large system of primary metaphors automatically and
unconsciously simply by functioning in the most ordinary of ways in in the 
everyday world from our earliest years. We have no choice in this. Because of 
the way neural connections are formed during the period of conflation, we all 
naturally think using hundreds of primary metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999: 
47)
In other words, this research program is laying out, theory by theory, the tacit 
dimension of the linguistic mind.
§ 41. Metaphors and Categorial Intuition
At a phenomenological level of analysis one could say that a metaphorical proposition
requires a more complex procedure towards fulfillment than a simple proposition. 
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Extrapolating from simple propositions to the more complex propositions of 
metaphors can be done by adding an extra step in the process of intentional 
fulfillment. If one says "The snow blankets the ground", the relationship between the 
earth and the snow upon the earth is mediated by the parallel meaning of the noun 
blanket in its relationship to what it covers. The categorial structuring operative in the 
judgment is in the silent, spatial preposition 'upon' in the sense of covering, which 
both relations share. This is the basic and shared categorial structure (placed by 
Fauconnier in the Generic Space). Then, and built upon this structure, a transference 
of seemingly contradictory qualities takes place. In the example the snow's quality of 
coldness is conflated with the warming features associated with a blanket, which now 
brings out qualities of the snow as if it protects the earth from possibly an even colder 
fate (this sorting would happen in the Blended Space).26 This blending of paradoxical 
qualities, and the sorting out which of the blendings makes sense, I would call 
provisionally transference and categorize its meaning-formation as one of the 
manners in which the productive imagination operates. 
COMPLICATION C: SCHEMATISM
§ 42. Schematismxvii
The goal in this section is to work our way backwards to Kant. Ricoeur made the 
connection between emplotment and the productive imagination explicitly stating that 
"the configurating act [of emplotment] is, as I have maintained, an operation of the 
productive imagination, in the Kantian sense of the term" (1985: 3) and that we "ought
not to hesitate in comparing the production of the configurational act to the work of the
productive imagination" (1983: 68). 
The route backwards from Bluck & Habrmas to Kant is more complex. Their paper 
gave some indication of the origin of the concept of schematism in certain writers 
which lead me to a group of cognitive psychologists making extensive use of the 
concept of schematiem like Neisser (1976); Schank & Abelson (1977); Rumelhart 
(1980); Alba & Hasher (1983) and Semino (2001). And it was Rummelhart and 
Semino who directed me to Kant as the originator of schema theory, i.e. that 
26 As a matter of fact a snow cover does prevent certain crops from freezing. 
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schemata are "building blocks of cognition", the "fundamental elements upon which all
information processing depends" (Rumelhart, 1980: 33; italics in original). 
§ 43. Schema Theory in Cognitive Psychology
As narrated earlier, while delving into the background of the Habermas & Bluck paper 
“Life Story Schema” I waded into a group of psychologists working on memory, 
scripts, schemata and other cognitive phenomena, which was very helpful. The idea 
is that knowledge is organized in loosely integrated clusters, which get activated when
prompted. A much used example, at the quotidian practical level, is the 
RESTAURANT script, which is the framework for a host of roles, props (thematic 
coherence), sequences (temporal), dos and don'ts (cultural) and conditionals 
(causal), which get triggered either top-down by just the concept 'restaurant', or 
bottom-up by reading/hearing a story and inferring after two or more contextual clues 
that the setting is a restaurant, or when you plan to be or are physically at such a 
place. According to these psychologists such schemas or frameworks are very 
efficient manners of organizing both knowledge and procedural know-how. 
Rummelhart's characterization is that,
Schemata are employed in the process of interpreting sensory data (both 
linguistic and nonlinguistic), in retrieving information from memory, in 
organizing actions, in determining goals and subgoals, in allocating resources, 
and, generally, in guiding the flow of experience (33-4). 
He then exclaims that "any device capable of all these wondrous things must be 
powerful indeed". To illustrate the working of schemata he presents some helpful 
analogies. First, schemata are not unlike the script of plays. For example we can 
conceive of the cluster of knowledge and know-how enabling the act of buying 
something as not unlike a loose, abstract play script containing the characters of a 
seller and a buyer, and the props of merchandise and money. The idea is then that 
the "an instantiation of a schema . . . corresponds to an enactment of a play" (36; 
italics in original). Second, schemata are like theories, but then "informal, private, 
[and] unarticulated" (37), which can account for what we perceive; be rejected if found
wanting; guide predictions; and infer non-perceived aspects. Third, and more active, 
schemata are like procedures, computing and evaluation their own fit with the 
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available data and directing its network of subprocedures. 
Schemata can be connected to the Husserlian concept of emptily intending something
in the sense that such intending is conceived as a structured projection with flexible 
procedures towards, and approximate expectations about, possible fulfillment. If we 
think we see a snake in the dark we did so because there were clues to perceive 
some form as a snake, i.e. we instantiated our snake schema and experienced it as 
fitting triggering evasive action, which would be for most people part of the snake 
schema. If the form was actually a rope, we'll soon realize that the projected snake 
schema did not fit and we'll switch to a rope schema. And to take a shot ahead of the 
game, such empty, projected, schematic intentionalities are arguably guided and 
produced themselves by the productive imagination. 
§ 44. The Transcendental Faculty of Imagination in Kant
The issue is the role and status of Kant's transcendental imagination as a crucial 
mediating faculty between conceptual understanding and empirical intuition, where 
the real production of knowledge happens in the manner of a synthesis of 
components, when intuitions are subsumed under concepts or concepts are applied 
to intuitions (Kant, 1978: 180f / A 137f / B 176f). 
Kant needed this mediation because in his system concepts were empty and 
intuitions still a bit under-organized. If "thoughts without content are empty [and] 
intuitions without concepts are blind" the question becomes how to make "concepts 
sensible" and "intuitions intelligible", because "only through their union knowledge can
arise" (93 / A 51 / B 75).  And their union needed a mediator in the form of the 
transcendental imagination, which is comprised of two essential elements: a 
schematism plus images. The schematism is a set of rules (i.e. coherences of 
different kind) connected to the concept (or, at the highest level, a category), under 
which enabling and constraining influences an image or set of images are generated 
which can connect with the intuition, which so far is only organized in spatial and 
temporal form, i.e. the inner and outer sense (183 / A 142 / B 182). Kant uses the 
example of the concept of a triangle and a dog to make his point. The concept 
provides a rule by which the imagination can generate semi-determinate images 
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applicable to a dog, for example that it is a "four-footed animal" (182-3). The idea is 
that the rules are still empty enough to connect to the concept and the images filled 
enough to connect with intuitions. 
As far as the dozen higher categories of understanding are concerned--like 
substance, causality, possibility, community (111-5 / A 76-83 / B102-9)--these are all 
variations of temporality. Substance abides, causality is sequential, possibility passes 
away, and community is synchronic. And the schemata connected with these 
categories are nothing but the rules by which we understand these variations as they 
play out in intuitions (183-5 / A 142-6 / B 181-4). If we perceive a tight diachronic 
sequence of events as causal, i.e. the first event is perceived as necessarily 
proceeding the second one as its cause, it is because the category of causality had 
indirectly organized--mediated by schemata and images--the manifold in perception in
that manner. 
How such a "transcendental product of imagination" comes about is according to Kant
something we might never find out. He deduces its existence from the knowledge 
producing operations of the mind, but thinks it "is an art concealed in the depths of the
human soul" (183 / A 141 / B 180). The point here is that schemas, schemata and 
schema-images and their operations enabled by the transcendental imagination are 
the hidden, tacit know-how from which more explicit knowledge products are 
generated like recognitions, classifications, connections, etc., by which we organize 
our perceptual realm and can subsume it under concepts. Later Kant dropped this 
tripartite interaction of three faculties and placed the schematism as part of the 
understanding (Heidegger, 1962b: 141-4). 
§ 45. Heidegger's Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant
Heidegger did not agree with Kant's downgrading of the productive imagination and 
reorganized and integrated the three faculties of intuition, understanding and 
imagination with a plant metaphor such that the understanding and intuition are the 
two stems and the imagination their common root (1962b: 144f). 
As all three faculties engage in a priori syntheses Heidegger renames the a priori 
synthesis of a concept its unity and the spatio-temporal synthesis in intuition a 
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synopsis, then to only give the full power of knowledge producing synthesis to the 
imagination with its schematism and schema-images synthesizing the categorial unity
of the concept with the spatio-temporal synopsis of intuition. 
Heidegger even went a step further by deriving both the faculty of understanding and 
the faculty of intuition from the imagination such that they are incorporated in one 
holistic structure, which deprives the understanding from its traditionally imputed logo-
centric primacy, and deprives intuition from its allegedly un-problematic, pre-formed 
givenness.
Another step Heidegger took was to organize the three faculties in a temporal, unitary
structure which lines up with Husserl's structure of time-consciousness and the 
sequentiality of intentionality (1997: 243-6). The primary synthesis of pre-cognition 
(imagination) "opens up and projects in advance a whole" (246), which enables a 
synthesis of apprehension (intuition), which in its turn enables a synthesis of 
reproduction (understanding).  All three syntheses have their unified ground in the 
unity of time.
Insofar as all three modes of synthesis are related to time and insofar as these 
moments of time make up the unity of time itself, the three syntheses maintain 
their unified ground in the unity of time (246; italics in original). 
By accentuating the three different ecstases of time one could say that the 
imagination is reaching futurally ahead towards an intuited immediate now, which 
significance can be grasped, just-later, by the understanding in reaching back to the 
no-longer-now.
This unitary sequence can also be reformulated with Husserl's terminology of a three-
staged Intentionality (empty - fulfilled - identity) and a triple-structured specious now 
(protention - source point - retention). In the protentive phase of the specious now an 
empty intentionality projects a categorially structured whole, which then might find 
fulfillment in a perceptual source-point, which, in the retentive phase, enables 
identification of the projected and fulfilled meaning and its expression in language.
In all these operations the faculty of transcendental imagination has primacy. Without 
its pre-figurative (or pre-cognitve or categorially structured) empty, projections no 
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meaningfully structured intuitions can be experienced, let alone subsuming them 
under appropriate concepts which apply to their significance.27 
As much as Kant's thoughts on the productive imagination were directly and indirectly
influential and fruitful in the development of schema theory by cognitive psychologists,
and as much as it could be argued that both Kant's work and its appropriation by 
Heidegger can further deepen this theorizing, it came as a surprise that Heidegger 
had abandoned this line of thought and had arguably not integrated it in his later work.
According to Brian Elliott this change was due to Heidegger's overall shift away from 
phenomenology after his deep engagement with Kant and writing Being and Time, 
towards aligning his thinking with poetry and a "mythopoetic conception of historical 
reality" (119). In the change the concept of the productive imagination as the 
fundamental source of the integration and unification of human experience goes into a
"silent retreat" (2). On the other side, according to William Richardson, the results of 
Heidegger's deep engagement with Kant did survive, but in a different terminology. He
makes the connection between the projective nature of the transcendental 
imagination and the manner in which Dasein projects and even is its possibilities 
(2004: 153f). 
§ 46. Definitional Conclusion of Schema Theory
As a tentative conclusion of schemata I propose the following: Schemata are the 
interacting and interconnected images, prototypes, rules and procedures lodged in 
the tacit dimension operative as 1) a mediator connecting the sensible realm of 
intuitions with the intelligible realm of empirical concepts (and transcendental 
categories as Kant worked out), creating meaningful and actionable experiences. 
Schemata also, and more originary, are active in 2) pre-figuring both the realm of a) 
sensible and co-dependent bodily motor experiences (kinesthetics) and b) their 
interpretation in language guided by empirical, categorial and existential concepts (as 
phenomenologists worked out). Underlying the diverse schematisms of life is the 
productive imagination which is the fount of all the formative structures preceding 
27 The multiple congruencies between Kant, Husserl and Heidegger I have to tried to capture in a 
triple column table. See Appendix C: By Way of Kant: Heidegger's Deepening of Husserl's 
Concept of Intentionality and Its Temporal Horizon. 
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experience which synthesize and meaningfully structure its heterogeneous elements. 
The productive imagination is active, not only in the manner how humans understand 
metaphorical expressions and emplotted narratives, but also how it is embedded in 
our daily practices, is operative in play, and guides scientific procedures. 
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CHAPTER 4: DENOUEMENT
§ 47. Rescue with Kant's Third Kritik
Not only proved Kant's notion of imagination, and Heidegger's phenomenological 
reworking it, very fruitful in understanding schema theory, but Kant also contributed in 
no small manner to an epiphany about how the welter of human experiences I had 
delved into during this research could receive some form of schematic organization. 
This flash of understanding happened in the struggle to understand Kant's notion of 
the aesthetic imagination.
In Kant's philosophy the concept of the imagination plays two different roles. The first 
one is cognitive in the production of knowledge when the imagination is the mediator 
between intuition and understanding. The imagination connects the two with rules and
schema-images. This was addressed in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1878). The 
relationship can be pictured as follows: 
Fig. 12. Kantian Mandala of the three major faculties                 
The imagination produces 1) rules from a concept, which is a first step in making 
concepts sensible, and 2) can connect intuitions to schema-images, which is the first 
step to make intuitions intelligible. When the rules and schema-images accord a 
proper subsumption of an intuition under a concept can occur, or, in the other 
direction, a proper application of a concept to an intuition can take place. Meanwhile 
the understanding and intuition are kept apart. 
The second role of the imagination is aesthetic and is addressed in Kant's Critique of 
Judgment (1987). With the example of a a poem Kant makes the case that in reading 
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and processing its rich language the imagination attains a freedom from the 
understanding, because it is not bound by any one specific conceptualization and 
actually provides the understanding with a "wealth of undeveloped material" (184-5 / 
Ak. 315-8)28 
If one would think in symmetries, then the notion of a free, playful imagination coupled
with the understanding might suggest a corresponding notion of a free imagination, 
but then coupled with perception. If poetry and other literary arts are relatively 
independent of perception, and imagination attains a certain creativity in this freedom,
how about the imagination attaining a certain measure of freedom when it is relatively 
unbound from the understanding and provides our intuition with a  "wealth of 
undeveloped material"? Of course in the visual arts we perceive more than what is  
perceptually presented. An "aesthetic idea" (186 / Ak. 317) is communicated by the 
artist and we, depending on our cultured state of receptivity, can, with the help of the 
imagination, perceive the idea. Then there are other non-verbal, creative practices in 
which conceptual understanding plays hardly any role at all like dance, children's play,
sports and sexuality.
Fig. 13. Simple Three-ring Mandala 
The above questions inspired the re-configuration of the Kantian mandala in fig. 13 
into a three-ring mandala comprised of the imagination, understanding and intuition 
and their overlaps enabling fictionality and play. 
28  Following the practice in the Hacket edition to refer to the original pagination by preceding it with 
Ak. i.e. the 1902  Akademie edition. 
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This figure became the launching pad to re-categorize man's practices and 
experiences, finding for almost any activity a place within this mandala. 
Under the category Fantasy one could place the literary arts (narrativity), hypothesis 
formation, Husserlian free imaginative variation and Jaynes' concept of 
"introspectable mind space". In short, any imaginative projection of mental, image-
based, situational, fictive possibilities. From a negative view it covers all possible 
experiences in which the intuition, i.e. sense experience, has no, or at least, minimal 
input. 
In the category Play one could place practices and experiences like play, sexuality, 
mysticism, mindless routines and expert performance. They all involve a perceptual 
projection of bodily, sense-based, narrowly situational act-possibilities. From a 
negative view it is all possible experiences in which the understanding has no, or at 
least, minimal input.
In the Truth and Action category one can place all experiences in which all three 
faculties contribute. Staying with Kant and the early Heidegger, the idea is that truth is
a product of the harmonious cooperation of all three faculties. Truth is traditionally 
conceived as located in a proposition as its truth value, but in phenomenology 
increasingly shifted towards perception and, in the hands of Heidegger, identified with 
the 'opening' enabled by the projective faculty of imagination. Following Arendt, the 
arguably highest level of action (communal and political) would necessarily bring in 
the understanding because such action is mostly executed by speech and legislative 
acts in which conceptual entities like ideals, plans and promises are brought to verbal 
expression.
For reasons of economy I will place the Complex Mandala and its clarification--in 
which is also included an enveloping notion of unity of consciousness and the three-




§ 48. Dasein's Schematism. 
Instead of dropping the transcendental imagination I will follow the early Heidegger to 
give primacy to the faculty of the image-producing schematism, which both structures 
our experiences in cognition and behavior on one side and is the platform for the 
formation of more abstract concepts on the other. And even while following Heidegger
here, I'm also making a move to apply this to his own existential philosophy.
To bring in narrativity I would make the case that the 'who' of Dasein is structured by 
the sub-schema of one's Life Story Schema (which includes its plans and future), 
which, according to Habermas & Bluck, mediates between one's sense of self and the
temporally integrated elements of one's past autobiographical memories, present 
situation and futural personal projects. The integration is effected by a set of four 
interconnected coherences: 1) temporal, 2) cultural concept of autobiography, 3) 
thematic and 4) causal. Here I would implement the same step Heidegger made by 
upgrading the schematism from mediator between self and experience to originator of
both one's sense of self and of the meaning of our experiences, as they fit and are 
pre-structured by one's Life Story Schema.
The next step is to bring both narrativity and schematism to the how and what of the 
world of Dasein and make the case that both 1) our more explicit, abstract concept of 
the world (our worldview) and 2) our experiences of the world (when watching the 
news or discussing politics or thinking about where this world is going to, etc.) as the 
wider context of one's own personal situatedness, are mediated by what I would call a
World Story Schema. Parallel to, and integrated with, one's personal Life Story 
Schema we do carry an unconscious, or rather, tacit view of the world organized by at
least a similar set of coherences which organize our life story: temporal (historical 
periodization; turning points), cultural (ideological and religious templates); thematic 
(accentuations on strife or progress or chaos or irony); and causal (impact of turning 
points; conceptualization of 'forces' at work). Because one's World Story Schema is in
structure very close to historical narration, Hayden White's categorization of possible 
historical discourses might also give some organization and flesh to the myriad 
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possibilities of this schema (1973: 29f). 
The last step to be addressed is the central and integrating structure between the 
'who' of Dasein and its world by way of investigating Being-in as such and how that 
connects one's Life Story Schema with one's World Story Schema. Several ideas 
already address this integration. For example the sociologist Norbert Elias (1978) 
makes a good case that the structure of one's personality and the structure of society 
are mutually enabling and constraining and that there is a natural, though jagged 
development in this mutual entanglement towards greater empathy and self-control. 
The influential sociology of knowledge study The Social Construction of Reality (1966)
by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann analyses identity formation within the 
dialectical process between society and individuals. Society is a product of man 
(externalization), which then gains a certain objective status because of routinized 
reality-maintenance by its members (objectivication), which then becomes something 
experienced as 'out there' by the younger, new members who will, through different 
levels of socialization, appropriate society and with it a certain identity 
(internalization). Because of historical dynamics both culture and identity are, within 
certain boundaries, quite fluid and contingent.xviii
Structurally the most important idea is an early Heidegger idea about Being-in as 
such (Inheit) as a structure of experience closely parallel to communion mysticism, in 
which the subject is in intimate communion with its object of reverence, but not totally 
absorbed by it (Schuller 2004a). Maybe this is the case because mineness is 
unsurpassable, even in mystic experiences. A last intriguing idea is that the two 
schemas of self and world are always already inter-meshed at the tacit, subconscious
level, and that to separate them is  merely an abstractive move overlooking their 
primordial inter-dependence as sub-schemas of the unitary, but distributive concept of
Being-in-the-world.
§ 49. Relation between Narrativity and Dasein
A series of questions and assertions suggested themselves to me when 
experimenting with the manner in which narrativity and Dasein could be related based
on Heidegger's 1924 lecture titled "The Concept of Time" (Heidegger, 2007: 200-213; 
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summary in Kisiel, 1992: 315ff). In this presentation, which Gadamer named the 
"Urform" of Being and Time, Heidegger makes one of his earliest and most succinct 
moves to characterize our human being in terms of temporality (Kisiel, 1992: 315). His
line of reasoning was that in order to understand time one has to understand one's 
own Dasein in relation to time and that, even before that, one has to get a grasp of 
"several fundamental structures of Da-sein itself", which turn out to be eight in total, 
all of which found their more systemically structured place in Being and Time 
(Appendix x). These structures ranged from the formal indicators like Being-in-the-
world to being-with-one-another to the "Everyone" and the for this study important 
idea of the "self-interpretation of Da-sein" in "speaking", which is the locus where 
"human being-in-the-world plays itself out and runs its course" and expresses "how it 
takes itself to be" (204; italics in original). The importance of discourse in any of its 
manifestations is of course that all of such have a narrative structure. In his 
conclusion Heidegger presents a series of questions by which his initial question 
"What is time?" obtains increased precision approximating an appropriate 
understanding of time.
"What is time?" turned into the question "Who is time?" More precisely: Are we 
ourselves time? Still more precisely: Am I time? Or closer still: Am I my time? 
(Heidegger, 2007: 213)
The last question became for me the launching pad into a series of my own queries 
around three leading questions.
1) "Am I my story?
This questions is based on the idea that Dasein not only understands itself through 
narrative discourse, but constitutes itself in that act. And here story is not taken as a 
"what", but as a "how", a classical move in phenomenology where there is a 
continuous displacement of questions regarding the what to the how, resulting in the 
question:
2) "Is the how of my being, the how of story?" 
And is the how of stories, emplotment? "Am I the plot of my life?" And if emplotment is
a cognitive synthesis enabled by the productive imagination, the question becomes 
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"Am I the capacity, process and product of my productive imagination?" The last lead 
question was,
3) "How do I live my story?"
Here the reasoning became clearly Arendtian with an initial differentiation between 
living one's live in a fictive mode, i.e. being caught in un-realized narrative scenarios 
acted out in in one's mind space, and a factic mode of pursuing possibilities in the 
three realms of one's vita activa: 1) being genuinely engaged in one's daily labor in 
the context of one's household; 2) being genuinely engaged in one's productive work 
in a career; and 3) being genuinely engaged in one's sociopolitical situation as a field 
of possible political actions (Arendt, 1998).29
§ 50. The Ontological Status of the Narrative Self 
The proposed idea that our identities are structured like a narrative does not 
necessarily yet settle the question whether humans have a life story or if we are 
nothing but our life story. Husserl would suspend that question and Heidegger fully 
engage it. The idea is that narrativity not only provides a necessary clarity to the 
temporal nature of Dasein, but that narrativity arguably also constitutes the kind of 
being Dasein is. "Dasein is narrative", one could say, or that the meaning or essence 
of our being is provided by, and is nothing more than, the plotted coherence inhering 
in narrativity. Some of the opening quotes at the beginning of this study can be 
tweaked toward one interpretation or the other. For example Bruner's statement that 
"we become the autobiographical narratives by which we 'tell about' our lives” (2003; 
italics in original) can be interpreted as if 1) there is an ontological difference already 
in place between an entity prior to the stories which can be told about 'it' and those 
posterior told stories themselves, or as if 2) the being which we become through 
autobiographical narratives exclusively exists by, in and through this telling. In the first
case, under the canopy of the verb to have, we can conceive ourselves as entities like
an immaterial Soul or Higher Self more or less independent of our temporal world and
29 Arendt acknowledges the epistemological importance of narrativity in man's quest for self-
knowledge, but does not seem to cross over into the ontological position. "Who somebody is or was
we can know only by knowing the story of which he is himself the hero--his biography" (Arendt, 
1998: 186). 
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history, which entity carries along with itself its personal life story as a contingent 
addition to its core identity. This trans-temporal higher entity can dip into its life story 
for purposes of self-reflection, or as a collection of storied adventures with which to 
entertain others, or just as a memory aid to keep track of its projects and ever-
changing social position. In the second case, under the canopy of being, all the above
enumerated functions of our life story are acknowledged, but now they are integral 
elements of our identity hanging as a web together but without a clear center of 
ownership. Carr is quite clear in taking this position: “The unity of self, not as an 
underlying identity but as a life that hangs together, is not a pregiven condition but an 
achievement" (Carr, 1991: 97). In its most stark formulation the proposition here is 
that, if there is no life story there can be no identity. Or, as Ricoeur might have said it, 
“narrative is the guardian of personal identity, insofar as there can be no thought 
about identity without narrated identity.” The original phrase which I appropriated and 
changed is: 
In its schematic form, our working hypothesis thus amounts to taking narrative 
as the guardian of time, insofar as there can be no thought about time without 
narrated time (1988: 241). 
§ 51. Postscript
The original plan of study was two-fold and had as its title "The possibility conditions 
and Overcoming of Narrative Identity". Because the first part proved to be so 
engaging the second part never received its due. To give a flavor of what might have 
been in store I will end this research with the provisional view I had in mind. 
Narrative Identity can be considered a middle phase in a larger psychological 
development which includes a post-narrative moment congruent with Dreyfus' highest
stage of skill acquisition, i.e. expert coping (practical and ethical) based on an 
engaged, circumspective, non-representational awareness of one's situation and its  
possibilities, which is not dependent (anymore) on any narrative organization. Only 
when triggered by questions about one's past or running into dilemmas not solvable 
through perception, the narrative organization of one's identity might temporarily kick 
in until the review is over or the situation is re-configured with analytic and/or narrative
tools and thereby re-perceived such that the situation can be again acted upon.
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Appendix B: Flow Chart of Intentionality in Different Experiences
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Appendix C: By Way of Kant: Heidegger's Deepening of Husserl's Concept of 
Intentionality and Its Temporal Horizon 
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coherence of meaning 
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Comparisons based on Gadamer (1960), Heidegger / MH (1962 & 1997), Husserl / EH 
(1964), Kant / A (1978), Kisiel / TK (2004)
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Appendix D:  Mandala of Conceptual Structure and Process
Complex Mandala with enveloping notion of unity of consciousness / Dasein 
and the three-phased dynamics of intentionality
Fig. 14. Full Mandala of                              
Conceptual Structure and Process                            
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Explanation of the Concepts, Faculties and Processes depicted in the Figure
Structure of the Mandala
The holistic and near-exhaustive structure of the figure is represented in the black 
circles and their categories #4-12 based on Kant's concept of three basic faculties 
(#5-7) and Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of those. The three grey 
boxes (#1-3) and the arrows are structural duplicates (or parallels) of #5-7 in order to 
bring out certain circular, tri-lectical dynamics based on Husserl's notion of 
intentionality and its three temporal phases. 
Temporality
The figure depicts one ultimate horizon of understanding, i.e. Temporality (#12). 
Temporality is the non-exceedable, transcendental possibility condition without which 
inner complexity nothing could be experienced nor understood whatsoever. It is not 
one category among others, but the one making the others possible as all ontological 
categories are variations of Temporality. 
One overarching unity, Apperception / Dasein (#4):
All experiences happen in the unity of a temporally stretched consciousness (or 
Temporarily Extended Self [TES]), which enables and constrains all syntheses 
happening. This consciousness is Dasein's be-ing of its historical-situational t/here. 
Six kinds of experience:
Fields #5-11 (except #10, which is a special case. See below) are enabled by 
Temporality and Apperception. 
Three major faculties of synthesis:
Imagination (#1 & 5). The faculty of transcendental imagination connects concepts 
with intuitions. In connection with concepts it can be conceived as generating a set of 
image-producing rules (schematism), which product, i.e. schema-images, can be 
connected with appearances (Intuition). Originally conceived by Kant as the mediator 
between Concept and Intuition, he also conceived it as its root, which idea was fully 
developed by Heidegger, who conceived it as the primordial possibility condition of 
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both Intuition and Understanding. 
Intuition (#2 & 6). Providing the raw, empirical materiel initially organized by the 
categorial framework of space and time providing temporal and spatial 'appearances' 
or Gestalts.  
Understanding (#3 & 7). The transcendental faculty of understanding provides the 
pure form, or a priori principles, of the syntheses of thought which apply, by way of the
imagination, to the objects given through the Intuition.
In Husserlian terms the understanding is the empirically empty rule book of how 
syncategorematic terms like 'and', 'or', 'is', 'next to', 'higher than' etc., organize and 
connect categorematic terms like 'house, 'brown', resulting in 'categorial expressions' 
like 'this green house is taller than that brown house'. Categorial expressions will find 
their fulfillment in 'categorial intuitions', in this case by seeing the two houses and 
organizing ones field of perception such that one sees that 'this green house is taller 
than that brown house'.
The 3-step process (#1, #2, #3) in various phenomenological 
conceptualizations:
The original template for this process is Husserlian intentionality: The temporal 
sequence of intentionality of empty (#1), fulfilled (#2), and stabilized intending (#3). 
Meaningful experience starts in emptily intending something, which achieves possible
fulfillment in a sense-based intuition, which subsequently can be subsumed and 
stabilized under a concept through re-cognition.
Though sense-based intuition is the basic kind of intentional intuiting, one can 
subsequently-- through abstraction and reflection--have founded, higher-level, non-
perceptual intuitions like, for example, understanding ('seeing') that the cat-animal 
pairing is one of the form of 'species-genus'. This is the transition from single-ray to 
multiple-ray experiences, or going from simple (seeing a cat) to categorial Intuitions 
(seeing that the cat is on the mat).
The Husserlian concept of a three-phased process can be lined up with his concept of
inner time consciousness in which a specious now can be differentiated into a) a 
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protentive, just-not-yet phase of a primary expectation (#1, futural), b) a source-point 
phase of a primal impression, (#2, present) and c) a retentive just-passed phase of a 
primary remembrance (#3), with all three being interdependent moments of the unity 
of experiential flux held together by an intertwined transversal and longitudinal 
intentionality. 
Heideggerian correction(s):
The imagination is the pre-cognitive, emptily intentional, projective starting phase 
(#1), which achieves possible fulfillment in a sense-based intuition (#2), which 
subsequently can be interpreted under a concept through re-cognition (#3).
This sequence can also be lined up with the three-phase dynamic of the three fore-
structures of interpretation: fore-having (#1), fore-viewing (#2) and fore-conceiving 
(#3).
Most importantly all three phases line up with Heidegger's concept of Temporality, i.e. 
the ecstasies of time. Pre-cognition is a future-oriented reaching ahead / a right-now-
not-yet (#1); fulfillment is in the immediate right-now (#2); and cognitive stabilization is
in the past just-now-no-longer (#3). 
Gadamerian hermeneutics. The act of interpretation of a text starts with a fore-
understanding of the text (empty) grounded in one's horizon (#1, schematism); then, 
while reading, an ongoing revision of one's fore-understanding(s) by trail & error and 
question & answer (#2, fulfilling), out of which can emerge a unity of coherence of 
meaning (#3, stabilization), leading to a fusion of horizons (or absorption of schemas) 
of reader and text.
Dreyfus' phenomenology of skill acquisition. Skill acquisitions usually start with verbal 
instructions (concepts, #3) which then get translated into specific rules of dos and 
don'ts and projecting possibilities (images, #1), which by trial and error and question 
and answer get fulfilled (holistic experience of body-environment experience, #2), 
which will feedback upon and refine the ever more accurate tacit understanding (#1) 
of the initial instructions (concepts, #3).
Pacherie's triple-leveled phenomenology of action. Pacherie differentiates three 
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intentionalities in the execution of an action. It starts with an abstract, deliberative 
overarching goal, named D-intention (#3), which then has to be translated, with the 
help of one's background knowledge or tacit understanding (#2), into a contextual 
perception of a concrete situated goal, named P-intention (#2), ultimately leading to 
M-intention(s), which is the execution of an instantaneous goal through bodily 
movement and its inherent proprioceptions and kinesthesia (#1). At the same time, all 
along the process, multiple corrections are possible by feed-forward and feed-back 
mechanisms.
Variations in psychology. Background knowledge, scripts, scenarios, paradigms, etc. 
(#1) become activated by, and will format, one's field of perception, including its 
possibilities (#2), leading up to possible new insights and understandings (#3), which 
in their turn either a) enriches (usually), b) transforms (sometimes), or c) replaces 
(rarely) the background schema (#1) resulting in a) an enriched, b) transformed or c) 
totally novel experience (#2).
Three major categories of experience enabled by the three major faculties and 
their possible interactions:
Art, Fantasy, Hypothesis and Art (#8). Imaginative projection of mental, image-
based, situational, fictive possibilities. From a negative view it covers all possible 
experiences in which the Intuition, i.e. sense experience, has no, or at least, minimal 
input. Ground on which multiple important phenomena are based:
Art in the Kantian sense as a free play between the faculties of understanding and 
imagination. 
Narrativity. The construction of a fictive story world with characters and events with no
necessary reference to reality. Words (#3) triggering schemas and images (#1) 
creating fictive experiences within a fictive world (#2), which are further enriched, re-
directed, made problematical as the story enfolds. 
Free Imaginative Variation. Husserl's major technique to separate out essential 
structures (moments) from contingent components (parts) by running in the 
imagination different variations of a phenomenon and see which component is 
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integral and which is contingent. This procedure qua experience has its own 
intentional arc and its own kind of Intuition of 'essences' (Wesenschau) and manner of
conceptualization. 
Introspectable mind space. Imaginative, metaphorical, reduced reproduction of one's 
world in which a metaphorical 'I' projects an analogue 'me' into possible scenarios of 
futural what-could-be's and past what-could-have-beens. This is what Jaynes calls 
'consciousness' (and his students J-consciousness), which is mostly accompanied 
with strong emotions of uncertainty and guilt about alternate outcomes projected both 
into the past as well as into the future. 
Hypothesis-, theory- and paradigm-formation takes place, like the Kantian concept of 
Art, in the free interplay between Imagination (#1) and Understanding (#3), with the 
obvious caveat that its testing is in Intuition (#2). 
Play, sexuality, mysticism, mindless routines and expert performance (#9). 
Perceptual projection of bodily, sense-based, narrowly situational act-possibilities. 
From a negative view it is all possible experiences in which the Understanding has 
no, or at least, minimal input. 
Overall congruent with Heidegger's concept of tacit, implicit understanding 
(Verstehen) in the many daily, routine, 'mindless' practices in one's life world.
Overall congruent with Dreyfus' concept of expert coping when there is a strong 
integration or intimate coupling between actor and situation, mediated by fine-grained,
sensitive circumspective awareness, and not (necessarily) mediated by thought. The 
role of Understanding is a) to guide the skill acquisition process to its non-mental, 
circumspective expert level or b) as a fall-back position to make quick analyses and 
corrections when careful  circumspection does not lead to expected states of affairs. 
Overall congruent with Gibson' concept of animal affordance or the perception of, and
acting upon, biologically relevant possibilities like food, water, danger, security and 
procreation. 
Truth & Action (#11).
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Truth is traditionally conceived as located in a proposition (#3) as its truth value, but in
phenomenology increasingly shifted towards perception (#2) and, ultimately in the 
hands of Heidegger, identified with the 'opening' enabled by the projective faculty of 
imagination (#1) accompanied by a strong critique of any leveling of such experience 
by conceptual abstractions (#3).
Action. Though Dreyfus would place expert level action (including mature moral 
actions) in box #9 of Play with its tight post-cognitive perception-action cycle, with 
Arendt the highest level of action (communal and political) would necessarily bring in 
the Understanding (#3) because such action is mostly executed by speech and 
legislative acts in which conceptual entities like ideals, plans and promises are 
brought to verbal expression.
One impossibility (#10)
Because the imagination is the sine qua non for the functioning of the other faculties, 
there can be no intelligible product coming from the interaction between the faculties 
of Intuition and Understanding alone. 
If perceptions are not meaningfully pre-formated by the faculty of the imagination then
there can be no Gestalt generated, which could be subsumed under a concept in an 
act of understanding. 
And--by reasoning from concept to its application in a perception--without the 
imagination no rules nor rule-based images (schema-images) could be generated for 
a concept to find any footing in Intuition to apply itself to. 
As Kant stated, “concepts are empty” and “perceptions are blind” and without the 
imagination the twain will never meet. 
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i Given the importance of narrativity to understand time, and also following Heidegger's central 
contention that the concept of Being, including our own mode of human being (Dasein), will 
have to be understood within the horizon of an interpretation of time (1961: 19/H1), it seems to 
be a small step then to chain the two propositions together and make the case that 1) in order 
to understand our own being we need to understand time, and 2) to understand time we need 
to understand narrativity, and therefore 3) the understanding of Dasein as a thoroughly 
temporal being, can only be achieved with the help of narrativity. On top of that reasoning, by 
switching levels from epistemology to ontology one could make also the following case that, 1) 
if Dasein is not only understandable in temporal terms but actually is time, and 2) time is not 
just understandable in narrative terms but actually is narratively structured through and 
through, then 3) Dasein is and only is its narrative.
ii I find the use of illustrations, figures and models very helpful, not only for myself to anchor my 
thoughts, but also for explanatory purposes. Its justification I find in the convergence of a few 
ideas. First of all it has been observed that many of the metaphors we use for understanding 
complex verbal expressions are rooted in either our visual domain or the one of manual object 
manipulation (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 48 & ; 1999: 238-40 & 240-41). In Lakoff & Johnson's 
notation of basic metaphors, THINKING IS PERCEIVING, and also THINKING IS OBJECT 
MANIPULATION and ARGUMENTS ARE BUILDINGS. “In general, we take an important part 
of our logic of knowledge from our logic of vision”(1999: 238). Secondly, Jaynes thinks that our 
deliberative thinking is executed in our inner mind space when we see ideas and manipulate 
them around as building blocks to build arguments, which seems to combine most mind 
metaphors into one metaphorical 'space'.(Jaynes, 1976: 50ff, 64-5) His definition that 
“[c]onscious mind is a spatial analog of the world and mental acts are analogs of bodily 
acts”(66) will be further explained and put into play later. Thirdly, and most intriguingly to 
explain the aptness of visual metaphors and the structure of Jaynesian three-dimensional inner
mind space, is Steven Pinker's idea that in the evolutionary process our deliberative rationality 
developed (or “rode piggy-back”) on top of our stereoscopic visual brain system. “Our capacity 
for abstract thought has co-opted the coordinate system and inventory of objects made 
available by a well-developed visual system” (Pinker, 1997: 191). Reflexive note: When one 
tires to conciliate (a technical term in Jaynes) the above three ideas one might very well be 
exercising this capacity of moving around and fitting heterogeneous elements into a new 
thought through a quasi-spatial manipulation of building blocks. And, running ahead a bit on 
what Kant might contribute to this discussion, we could also conceive this operation as the 
synthesis of different concepts and intuitions with the help of images and image-schemas all 
directed by the mediating transcendental faculty of imagination, or productive imagination, 
which concept will take center stage later on. 
iii One other method to which I became accustomed while engaging Analytic philosophy and 
found myself applying in this research is to look for dual layers in phenomena with a surface 
level getting explanatory clarification from what can be detected to happen in a more or less 
mechanistic manner at just one level deeper. The paradigmatic example by which I was 
introduced to such thinking was 'a diamond scratching a glass'. On the surface level one can 
observe a diamond leaving a scratch in a piece of glass, which at one level deeper can be 
explained by the fact that the carbon atoms of the diamond are stronger bonded than the 
molecules comprising the glass and that under certain pressure and movement the carbon 
atoms of the diamond will stay intact and displace the glass molecules by breaking their 
bonding (Gillett, 2007; Schuller, 2014). This manner of explanatory modeling was named 'Inter-
Level Mechanistic Explanation' or ILME. The major reason that this idea of mechanistic 
explanation came into play is that some, if not most, of the operations by which meaning is 
experienced--from quotidian skills like cooking to composing a philosophical thesis—are so 
subterranean and tacit, that it helps to try to model them in a more or less mechanistic manner.
Such modeling can be done with the caveat in mind that we are not talking about purely 
physical mechanisms—though the experience of meaning is anchored in brain-environment 
interactions—but about how non-verbal, embodied meaningful practices and verbal meanings 
are connected in their own realm and between them. If you would only look at figure 4 on page 
197, capturing the multiple interactions of feed-forward and feedback mechanisms involved in 
the process of going from verbal planning to embodied action, and see how much of that 
system is actually accessible to waking consciousness, you might get a sense of how many 
interactions are subterranean and how much its modeling might help us understand the whole 
process. The figure was composed by the French phenomenologist Elizabeth Pacherie (2008) 
and can be seen as belonging to a tradition of naturalized phenomenology as pioneered by 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) and developed among others by Dreyfus (2002), Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus (1986), Varela et al (1991) and Thompson (2007). Not only the Pacherie model of 
action can be interpreted as an instantiation of the ILME model, but also the 'network model' by
cognitive psychologists Gillen Fauconnier and Mark Turner (2002). According to the authors 
this model captures the tacitly executed conceptual projections and blendings which need to 
happen when we understand counterfactuals, metaphors and simple scenarios (§40). Other 
instantiations were developed by George Lakoff and Srini Narayanan in their 'computational 
models' of metaphoric reasoning and narrative (1999, 2010). The fascinating part of that 
research is that the authors apparently were able to isolate the necessary components and 
their interactions in the generation of metaphors and narratives such that those could be 
formalized into computer programs "able to interpret simple stories and narrative fragments in 
the domain of international politics and economics" (2010: Abstract). Underlying the footwork 
by these authors, I would argue, is their own implicit understanding and application of Husserl's
technique of free imaginative variation (or eidetic reduction) by which they were able to create 
ILME-like models. And, as far as I am concerned, I am weaving these complex connections 
guided by my own half implicit, half explicit understanding of the double-layered models 
operative in phenomenology (eidetic reduction covering the procedural how), cognitive 
psychology (network and computational models covering the thematic what) and analytic 
philosophy of science (ILME covering the explanatory why), all in their subterranean 
cooperation explaining cognitive accomplishments.
iv Heidegger adopted and regarded as crucially important Husserl's concepts of intentionality and
categorial intuition (1985: 27ff). Heidegger's transformational spin on these concepts was to 
reverse the relationship between consciousness and world, which in Husserl's thought could be
seen as if consciousness imposed its intentional categories on life like a form on matter 
(congruent with Kant), while Heidegger saw life as already categorially or syntactically 
structured, which immanently understood significance could be interpreted and expressed in 
language. This pan-hermeneutic notion of life is well captured in Heidegger's phrase "the 
hermeneutics of facticity", in which the preposition of has to be read as a double genitive: 
though we have a certain leeway in interpreting our facticity, the latter has already a deeply 
hermeneutic nature brought about by our ancestors and into which we are inducted as we 
acquire language and our culture's practices (Heidegger, 1999). To verbally express this pan-
hermeneutic life as we live it, Heidegger developed his innovative language of “formal 
indications” or existential categories like Being-in-the-world, which indicate the elusive how of 
our experience of existence, which can only show in the enactment of the experience itself 
(Kisiel, 1996 & 2002).
v A secondary source is the quasi-phenomenological work by the "world philosopher" (Williams, 
2004) and spiritual teacher of Indian origin, Jiddu Krishnamurti. His aim was a thorough critique
and transformation of modern selfhood, and claims for himself to have gone through a 
fundamental transformation in relation to cognition. His talks and descriptions of his own 
experiences will contribute to the notion of overcoming narrative identity, which identity is in 
essence a cognitive accomplishment though deeply buried in the tacit dimension. The 
investigation of this aspect will have to be executed in another study.
vi  Another more naturalistic framing of this field of different levels sandwiching narrative identity 
and action can be found in a four-fold differentiation of behavior between: 
1. pre-personal, instinctual, evoked behavior;
2. cultural, habitual, acquired behavior; 
3. rational, deliberative, reflective behavior,
4. meditative, perceptive, trans-reflective, intuitive behavior.
Especially the first three structures can be found explicitly with the psychologists in this study 
like MacAdams (2010: 180), Nelson (1996; 26-58) and Boyd (2009: 31-41); and with the 
naturalist phenomenologists Varela et al (1991: 185-214) and Thompson (2007: 166-218). My 
first exposure to this helpful categorization was through the libertarian political scientist Larry 
Arnhart (2009: 19-34), who derived it from Aristotle's concepts of physis (nature), ethos (habits)
and logos (deliberation) and also found this trichotomy in Darwin's concepts of impulsive 
instincts, slowly-gained habits and deliberate reflection (19-20; see Darwin, 2004: 132-51). Per 
Richardson (2004: 78-103) this trichotomy can also be found in Nietzsche as a stratification of 
three different levels of selection: natural, social and elective.
vii In psychology one can find parallels with the concept of the specious now and the syntheses 
enabled thereby. In the research program on memory it is called the episodic buffer of our 
working memory system, which system would integrate long term memory (explicit memory) 
and action, and also make the comprehension of language possible (Baddely, 2000, 2012). 
"The episodic buffer is assumed to be a limited-capacity temporary storage system that is 
capable of integrating information from a variety of sources. It is assumed to be controlled by 
the central executive, which is capable of retrieving information from the store in the form of 
conscious awareness, of reflecting on that information and, where necessary, manipulating and
modifying it. The buffer is episodic in the sense that it holds episodes whereby information is 
integrated across space and potentially extended across time" (Baddely, 2000: 421). 
viii  To be added is the idea that the experienced now is also specious enough that we can reflect 
upon our own experiences as they flow by (or we flow in them) by bending backwards on our 
experience in its not-yet-passed just past phase (Husserl, 1969: 161-3). As I am writing this 
sentence I can catch myself writing this sentence and can switch at different speeds between 
the act of reflection, which might interfere with the writing, and the act of writing itself, which 
pushes reflection into the background and even possibly terminate it as the focus of 
consciousness is directed again exclusively on the subject matter written about, that is, I can 
non-self-consciously write about self-consciousness. This act is not based on explicit memory, 
like when I can say that I remember having started this paragraph with the words "to be 
added". This manner of reflection is also a necessary aspect of doing phenomenology. At the 
end of hearing the Beethoven meme, when the melody is experienced as the unity of retended 
notes, we can reflect back on this unity through reflection and transform the lived experience of
the meme into an object of investigation. 
"Since each phase is retentionally cognizant of the preceding one, it encloses in itself, in a 
chain of mediate intentions, the entire series of retentions which have expired. . . . It is 
thanks to retention . . . that consciousness can be made into an Object" (Husserl, 1969: 
162). 
Though the above analysis pertains to a more refined, controlled philosophical kind of 
reflection--by which hard to detect constituent elements of experience can become 'objectified' 
for investigation--in our daily, naive acts of reflection most people tend to separate and objectify
the subject-pole of experience. Usually we are absorbed, self-forgettingly in our daily activities, 
but so now and then, and for some people often even to the point of pathology, we will reflect 
on our daily experiences and highlight its subject-pole by which a sense of enduring self-same 
unity might arise usually named 'my self' or ego. This sense of self is usually lived as if it had 
always already been present and enduring, even when forgotten in absorbed experiences. 
Initially Husserl thought that the ego was an "empirical object" like any other and should not be 
thought of as a principle providing the unity of consciousness (1970a: II, 85-6 ), but changed 
his mind when he claimed to have discovered the transcendental ego as a permanent 
necessity transcending and uniting any and all of its temporary, changeable experiences (1962:
§57, 156-7). Sartre strongly disagreed and made the case that the ego does not inhere in 
consciousness but is one of its products through the act of reflection (1957: 42-54). Whether 
self-constituted or as a by-product of reflection, once the personal or empirical ego is 
constituted, a narrative identity can be grafted upon it by metaphorical transference. The point 
is that the speciousness of the now has a complex stretched structure which allows multiple 
acts to be executed resulting in multiple products (Husserl, 1973: 175-6). 
ix During this study I found numerous psychological studies contributing fine-grained 
differentiations I had not found (yet) in phenomenological studies. Of course I cannot be sure 
about that, because the phenomenological field is so vast. At the same time I found that certain
phenomenological insights could have contributed to the conceptual rigor of psychological 
studies. Especially in the following empirical linguistic and psychological studies I observed this
dialectic: Paul Bremond (1980; Ricoeur, 1985: 38-44 ) and the minimal structure of narrative 
(§34); Moore & Lemon (2001) and the emergence of the temporally extended self; Nelson 
(1996) and the emergence of narrative intelligence (§27); Baddeley (2000, 2012) and the 
specious now (§18); Erikson (1968; 1980) ) and the establishment of personal identity; Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980; 1999) and the meaning innovations through metaphor (§40); Jaynes 
(1976) and the emergence of inner mind space. In short, almost any psychological study I used
provided third person descriptions of experiences which, through imaginative empathy, could 
be re--experienced and thereby become available for phenomenological reflection and 
connected to the findings of other phenomenologists.
x And it could be argued that the generative phenomenology program is for a large extent 
fulfilled by the hermeneutic-existential phenomenology program initiated by Heidegger in his 
investigation of our Dasein's primordial structure of being-with-others (Mitsein) and historicality 
(1962, II, V); further elaborated by Gadamer's phenomenology of the implicit, always already 
operational impact of history and traditions in the form of inherited, productive, interpretative 
prejudices (1960, Second Part, Chapter II: 238f); and Ricoeur's idea of our being embedded, 
even entangled, in the formative narratives of our predecessors (1988: 109-16). Heidegger's 
hermeneutic breakthrough had its parallel in Husserl's transition from a solipsistic account of 
inter-subjectivity in his Cartesian Meditations (1969b: Fifth Med.: 89f) to a more communal 
account in the Crisis book with its leading generative-phenomenological concept of the 
Lifeworld (1970b, Part III A: 103-89).
xi Borrowing terms from Labov one could say that humans like to attain one or more resolutions 
in life in the sense of denouements of, or dis-entanglements from, accumulated complications, 
leading to some variant of climactic or happy ending. We usually prefer resolved stories, 
especially our own, though, I would add, dwelling in the other Labovian phases of a narrative 
as fundamental life attitudes are definitely possible and recognizable. For example there might 
be narrative-psychological types of eternal beginners fearing futural commitment (orientation); 
drama and tension seekers enjoying the complexities of the immediate present (complication); 
moralists judging anything and everything form an ethical-theoretic position, reflectively 
overlooking the whole of temporality (evaluation); and problem solvers directed towards a 
desirable future (resolution). This line of thought, with its accentuated narrato-temporal 
dimensions, was inspired by Heidegger's notion that the three "ecstases" of time (1962a: 375-
78 / H 327-9) can become accentuated stances towards life: dwelling on the past (facticity); 
focusing on the present (falling), openness towards the future (ex-istence; standing-out), with 
the last one the more primal and authentic one (1962a: 389f / H 339f).
xii For example, the founding fathers of the American republic might become a collective of 
heroes, which, either in their current, flattened, popular interpretation become half-understood, 
pedastalled, mythic figures with limited impact, or they can become a fount of radical and deep 
understandings of the broader, civilizational enlightenment project of which they were part and 
parcel, eliciting political commitments to realize the not yet fully completed revolutionary project
of free citizenship within the context of a democratic republic. And again, I do not mean that 
these persons become merely exemplars to be imitated, but that their imputed projects 
become deeply embedded in, and formative of, our own narrative identity, especially in its 
open-ended, forward looking gaze. The same ambiguity bedevils the image and impact of 
radicals like Jesus, Gandhi or Martin Luther King as exemplars. In the default popular 
imagination they have become sanitized and harmless, and their potential to impact identity 
formation is dependent on those daring and creative individuals who would dig deep into their 
lives and appropriate their unrealized past projects.
xiii Here I like to point out another parallel with Heidegger. When idem identity overlaps with ipse 
identity its manner of being is arguably inauthentic, i.e. it has not yet differentiated itself from its
factic background by emancipating itself from its half-consciously acquired habits and 
identifications formatting its average everydayness. When, per Ricoeur, ipse identity starts to 
loosen itself from idem identity through more resolutely developed commitments and a shift 
occurs from naive egoism to the primacy of the Other, the person is arguably in a mode of 
authentic individuation (Heidegger, 1962: H 42-3 / 68). And I would place such achievement on 
a developmental scale of gradable realization or intensity and not construe it, per Heidegger 
(1962: H 385 / 437) as an all-or-nothing visionary act taking hold of the whole of one's life in 
one swoop, though this cannot be ruled out as historical examples might be found fitting the 
criterion.
xiv  Besides, or on top of, the important dialectic between idem and ipse identity, Ricoeur identified
another important dialectic constituting our selfhood, which would put some limit to the 
tendency of narrativity to be all-encompassingly inclusive. This dialectic is situated between 
selfhood, i.e. one's narrative identity, and otherness, i.e. that which is radically different from it, 
though still integral to one's selfhood. Otherness comes in three categories. They are 1) the 
otherness of one's own body as part of the material, causal world, mediated by the 
phenomenon of Flesh, which is the lived, experienced body with its senses, motility and tacit 
skills through which this body and its world are disclosed (319f); 2) the otherness of other 
persons, mediated by the phenomenon of intersubjectivity, in which process a self and another 
mutually constitute each other as both similar and radically different (329f); and 3) the 
otherness of one's conscience, which is the most hidden relation of the self with itself, and is 
mediated by a call, silent or not, coming from one's conscience, issuing an appeal to itself to 
take hold of itself and become properly itself by emerging from the anonymous They (341f). 
Ricoeur considers all three not as impositions upon selfhood from outside "as though to 
prevent its solipsistic drift", but as belonging to the "ontological constitution of selfhood" (317). 
Though Ricoeur does not address systematically their connection, it could be observed that it 
is through one's lived body with its senses, motility and expressiveness that we encounter 
other people by seeing their face and gestures, and hearing their voice, which can trigger one's
conscience as a summons to act authentically by becoming proper to the unique event of 
encountering one another. Unexpectedly Ricoeur does not bring into play the rich 
epistemological virtues of narrativity to mediate this ethical-ontological dialectic between 
selfhood and otherness. After all it is not hard to remember or imagine that a culture's stock of 
canonical stories will present numerous events depicting bodily challenges, social demands 
and ethical dilemmas, which can evoke the sometimes uncanny strangeness of one's own 
body, of one's encounters with others, and of one's own conscientious promptings. And, 
because of the triple-phased mimetic process, such readings will have an effect on our 
perception of, and acting in, our lifeworld.
xv Bamberg's micro-analysis of the emergence of self and identity in daily, local interactions might
easily be wedded to the "radical microsociology" of American sociologist Randall Collins (1998 
& 2004), who built upon earlier work by sociologists Emile Durkheim and Ervin Goffman. His 
focus is on specific social situations which he names "interaction rituals (IR)" which contain the 
following ingredients. It is a situation in which 1) at least two persons participate with 2) their 
attention on the same object or action (and each knowing that the other is also paying attention
to the same subject), 3) sharing a common mood, 4) which mood together with the attention 
becomes intensified, resulting in 5) a sense of sharing and group-formation including a sense 
of mutual moral commitments, which 6) will fill the participants with "emotional energy (EE)", 
which might be carried by participants from situation to situation and thereby create "interaction
ritual chains (IRC)" (1998: 22-3). The interaction rituals he refers to can be just daily dialogues, 
entertainment events or attending a conference. In short, any situation fulfilling the above 
criteria. Successful participants also build up or lose "cultural capital (CC)" as their skills, 
contributions and especially emotional infusion of available EE, are acknowledged or 
challenged. Though Collins does not address the process of identity formation which will 
happen in such situations--as a sociologist he considers situations as primary and individuals 
as secondary (2004: 3-6)--it should not be a stretch to argue that the ongoing process over 
time of accumulating and spending EE and CC in IRCs will contribute to, or even constitute, 
one's sense of self during interactions and out of which a sense of more enduring identity might
emerge when movements from one IR to another develop patterns and stability. The closest 
maybe Collins comes to addressing the contribution of social situations to individuality is the 
statement that "much of what we consider personality consists of the extent to which persons 
carry the energy of intense Interaction Rituals" (1998: 23).
xviThe Career of Narrativity. Narrativity went through a radical change of status once the narrative
turn took place. Traditionally it was considered a peripheral kind of discourse. When the 
cognitive qualities of narrative became clear it arguably attained equality to explanatory 
discourse. And at this time quite some psychologists and philosophers consider narrative the 
natural origin of, and the superior to, other kinds of discourses. An early challenge to the reign 
of explanatory discourse came from the American historian Hayden White (1973, 1980). Then 
the epistemological importance of narrative intelligibility was explored by MacIntyre (1981), 
then firmly established in Ricoeur's Time and Narrative (1984-88). The theory attained a 
relatively early universalization in Bruner's paper "The Narrative Construction of Reality" (1991)
and reached recently a full theoretical exposition in A New Theory of Mind: The Theory of 
Narrative Thought (Beach & Bissell, 2016). 
xvii The Career of Schematism. It first lit up in Kant's A edition of his first Critique, only to be 
muffled away in the B edition. A direct line from Kant goes to Heidegger (1962b, 1997), who 
interpreted Kant's concepts of schematism and productive imagination from within a 
phenomenological framework as a part of his project as laid out in Being and Time, but did not 
further incorporate his findings in later works. Schema theory received a good boost from 
Merleau-Ponty in his phenomenological processing of real life cases of persons with deviations
in their perception and motor intentionalities leading to the concept of body schema in his 
body-centric thought. Then some linguists and psychologists picked it up in the 1970s and 
1980s. Early pioneers were cognitivist psychologists Ulric Neisser (1976), Roger Schank and 
Robert Abelson (1977) and David Rummelhart (1980). The latter, in his paper "Schemata: The 
Building Blocks of Cognition”, made an explicit connection to Kant and, like him, claimed an 
essential role for schemata in cognition. They are making the case that all cognition and 
behavior is organized by unconscious frameworks, scripts, schemas, schemata, etc., which all 
spring into action when prompted by situational clues. Mark Johnson, who also was 
instrumental in establishing the metaphor research program (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) 
integrated multiple lines of psychological and philosophical investigations on metaphors, 
schemata and the imagination in his The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, 
Imagination, and Reason (1987). Some of these scientists are a bit flummoxed by the question 
of the ontological status of these schemata because they are not directly visible and can only 
be deduced to be necessarily there (Bluck & Habermas). Kant also thought that the working of 
the transcendental imagination is inaccessibly tucked away somewhere in the soul. 
xviii As a last thought, I do think that most of the logic of societal and individual change can be 
understood through a Darwinian theory of cultural and social selection, which would draw on 
and transform a functionalist stream in sociology (Runciman, 2009). Some social practices are 
more functional or advantageous for society than others. Actually, sometimes deceptions and 
self-deceptions are functional for reality- and identity-formation and reality- and identity-
maintenance (Trivers, 2011). 
